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Rethinking the 1961 Baixa de Kassanje 
revolt: Towards a relational 
Geo-History of Angola*
Aharon de Grassi**
Abstract: Through a geographic and relational reinterpretation of the start of armed nationa-
list struggle in Angola, this article helps to critique and move beyond common interpretations 
of Angola (and Africa more generally) as characterized by long-standing socio-spatial divisions. 
Rather than an economic protest in an enclave, the so-called «cotton revolt» actually had mul-
tiple aspects — some explicitly nationalist — in a mobilization that was forged through multiple 
connections spanning urban and rural areas, Malanje and Luanda, and Angola and the newly in-
dependent Congo. The revolt happened at Malanje’s transforming crossroads of an underground 
Luanda-Malanje political network of churches, contracted laborers and administrative person-
nel that intersected with Congo-based provincial political mobilization organized through trans-
border ties. These combined nationalist networks articulated primarily but not exclusively with 
discontented peasants who faced joint state-corporate attempts to use intensiﬁ ed labor, spatial 
restructuring, control, and risks to overcome resistance and stagnating cotton production. These 
patterns and the ways that the colonial government and settlers responded with farm mechaniza-
tion, infrastructure and regional development as counter-insurgency measures would partly sha-
pe post-independence rural development projects, and, ultimately, also now post-2002 national 
reconstruction. Rethinking the Baixa de Kassanje revolt in relational, geographical, and historical 
terms allows a more accurate understanding of the trajectories of Angolan and African political 
economies, and hence effective avenues for progressive social change.
Key-words: Angola, nationalism, rural, Geography, cotton.      
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Through a geographic and relational reinterpretation of the start 
of armed nationalist struggle in Angola, this article helps to critique 
and move beyond common interpretations of Angola (and Africa 
more generally) as characterized by long-standing socio-spatial di-
visions between enclaves of coastal creole elite and the impoveri-
shed hinterlands that they purportedly dominate through combina-
tions of force, patronage, and/or neglect (BAYART 1993; MESSIANT 
1998; HERBST 2000; VIDAL 2002; CHABAL 2002; COOPER 2002; 
KYLE 2005; FERGUSON 2006; SOARES DE OLIVEIRA 2015). Drawing 
on a range of important sources that have hitherto been unused or 
under-used, the paper makes a range of contributions to the agra-
rian history of Angola, African geography, spatiality in theories of 
African political economy, relational geography, and to histories of 
nationalism, gender, colonial concessions, churches, cotton, and 
rural protest in Africa.1 
Contrary to most prevalent histories of Angola — academic, ofﬁ -
cial, and colonial — Angola’s armed nationalist struggle appears to 
have been ﬁ rst launched in Kassanje, preceding the famed prison 
attack in Luanda on February 4th, 1961. The key Kassanje revolt in 
northern Malanje Province that began more than a month earlier 
is conventionally (mis)portrayed as a colonial massacre of farmers 
protesting particular economic abuses by a foreign company opera-
ting a concession in a purported enclave of the Kassanje lowlands 
(«baixa») where it had the state-delegated exclusive right of pur-
chasing of farmers’ cotton.2 Although there were attempts to enforce 
certain enclavist provisions, in practice these and other activities in-
volved much more dynamic and layered geographies of connection. 
The so-called «cotton revolt» was actually also a polysemic — and 
often explicitly nationalist — mobilization forged through multiple 
1  
  New sources include unpublished Junta de Exportação de Algodão reports from 
the Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU) and Arquivo Histórico Militar (AHM), 
unpublished internal Cotonang reports from Banco Nacional Ultramarino archi-
ve, Banco de Angola annual reports for Malanje, and the Angola Norte newspa-
per, and revisited sources include the Boletim Oﬁ cial, the revolt ﬁ les at AHU (MU/
GM/GNP/052/Cx.3), and the Anuário Estatístico.
2
   The designation «Baixa de Kassanje» is not an indigenous term, and is used 
throughout the text to refer only to the region during the colonial period around 
the eastern lowlands of the old «Malange District», rather than the previous his-
torical political formations, known as the Kasanji State, on which more careful 
study is greatly needed (particularly given the varying use of terms by different 
people, Cassange and Cassanje most often in the colonial period, and Kassanje 
or Kasanje since then) (see MILLER 1972; KAMABAYA 2007). 
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connections spanning urban and rural areas, Malanje and Luanda, 
and Angola and the newly independent Congo. The revolt happe-
ned at Malanje’s crossroads of an underground Luanda-Malanje 
political network of churches, contracted laborers and administra-
tive personnel that intersected with Congo-based provincial politi-
cal mobilization organized through trans-border social ties. These 
combined nationalist networks articulated primarily but not exclu-
sively with discontented peasants who faced joint state-corporate 
attempts to use intensiﬁ ed labor, control, and risks to overcome re-
sistance and stagnating cotton production.
This relational account provides an important corrective to Lu-
anda-centric accounts of nationalism, and interpretations of the re-
volt that focus on parochial, economic, millenarian, enclavist aspects 
and therefore occlude not only the processes and connections that 
were the proximate triggers of the nationalist revolt in Malanje, but 
also the sedimented longer-term spatial processes that produced 
the structural conditions of interlinked agrarian intensiﬁ cation and 
nationalist networking. I conclude by brieﬂ y arguing that such a re-
lational account also helps to comprehend how, since the end of war 
in 2002, contemporary socio-spatial patterns oil-windfall spending 
and governance throughout Angola have been profoundly shaped 
not simply by coastal elites’ patronage and exploitation of hinter-
lands and interior enclaves, but also by some important geographic 
legacies of subsequent dynamics following the 1961 revolt and start 
of armed nationalist struggle — namely, mechanization, counter--
-insurgency logistics, and regional development initiatives.
It was during ﬁ eldwork — when an elderly soba (chief) offhande-
dly mentioned to me, between bites of fresh sweet cassava while we 
took a break from weeding his intercropped rows in western Malan-
je that he too had been arrested after the 1961 revolt — that I began 
to really appreciate that the dynamics of the revolt were not restric-
ted, as commonly perceived, to the Baixa lowlands in the east. La-
ter, when I heard on the nightly news of the provincial radio station 
that the author of a recent book about the revolt would be speaking 
at Malanje’s agricultural college at Quéssua (Keswa) near the old 
American Methodist mission and school, I set out early and headed 
to the amphitheater at Keswa built by Cubans and reconstructed by 
Chinese.3 This book — the ﬁ rst participant’s extended account of the 
3
    Note, I have tried to use post-independence Bantu spelling, substituting K for Q, 
and hard C’s.
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revolt — delicately but insistently showed the distinctly nationalist 
(and not only anti-colonial) character of the mobilization and re-
volt, and I have tried to carefully assess, situate and build upon this 
otherwise yet unappreciated work.
Since much of the revolt’s basic aspects and chronology have been 
described by other authors (who sometimes draw selectively on each 
other), I will not rehearse them in detail here (see MARCUM 1969; PÉ-
LISSIER 1978; FREUDENTHAL 1999; KAMABAYA 2007).4 Instead, I will 
here provide a very brief summary in order to be able to then use a 
discussion of further details to point out the varying ways that diffe-
rent people have interpreted the revolt, and present my own new, 
geographical interpretation. I am speciﬁ cally drawing on and deve-
loping a critical geographical conceptual approach that emphasizes 
that social relations are always also spatial relations, mutually produ-
ced through multiple temporal and spatial scales.5 
In the Baixa de Kassanje in the eastern part of the Province of 
Malanje, some 500 km east of the capital Luanda, black alluvial 
soils fed by north-ﬂ owing tributaries of the Congo River were used 
by African farmers under Portuguese colonial compulsion to grow 
cotton for sale since the 1930s, as well as to pay obligatory colonial 
taxes. The Portuguese state allocated concessions with the rights to 
recruit labor and promote, purchase, and process cotton in the area 
to a company (the Angolan General Cotton Company, known by its 
4
   As a controversial topic, the revolt has also attracted more study with some new 
insights but still needing more systematic analysis: Buijtenhuijs (1991), Ca-
macho (2002), Cann (2011, 2012, 2015), Curto and Cruz (2012), Freudenthal 
(2012), Keese (2004), Mateus (2011), Pitcher (1991), Silveira (2013), Paredes 
(2015: 202-24), Antunes (2015). Generally un-sympathetic pieces by Portuguese 
military ofﬁ cials that discuss Kassanje in relation to the anti-colonial war more 
generally include Rebocho Vaz (1993), EME (1998), and Nunes (2005). There is 
still a great deal of research to be done on the revolt, including locating more of 
the archives of Cotonang, the Junta de Exportação de Algodão, and the Institu-
to de Algodão de Angola, consulting the Operations Reports of the Portuguese 
Army, as well a thorough review of relevant materials in the AHNA and AHU, the 
Holy Spirit mission archives, and oral history in the region (particularly regar-
ding gender and women) (see also MILLER 1972). See also the excerpt from the 
video «A Guerra: Part 7», by Joaquim Furtado, at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=f7up6w-a3Fc.
5
    This contrasts with Weberian notions of determination through the interaction 
of abstractly discrete units. See e.g. Massey (1994), Lefebvre (1991), Hart (2002), 
Goswami (2004), and cf. also Cooper (1994) and Terretta (2013).
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Portuguese acronym, Cotonang) held by about a dozen mostly Por-
tuguese and Belgian interests.6 
The main period of active revolt ran from January of 1961 through 
March, though since December people had been resisting, slowing 
down their work, «killing white animals, refusing to pay taxes and 
sow cotton» (FREUDENTHAL 1999: 283). January was the beginning 
of the cotton planting season, and farmers and non-farmers also 
refused administrative orders. The ﬁ rst incidents began in January 
as ofﬁ cials returned from Christmas break. On January 4th there 
was unrest evident around four villages where discontent with state 
sepoys — «cipaios» — had simmered for years, just a few kilometers 
north of the administrative and commercial cotton post Milando.7 
Villagers tried to tie up a local interpreter for the state, but his ac-
companying cipaio intervened, and the two African functionaries 
returned to the administrative post conﬁ rming rumors frightening 
the state staff (MONTEIRO, op. cit.). Villagers continued organizing 
amongst themselves, and then on the 12th, after villagers again re-
fused cipaios’ orders about taxes and cotton and threatened to kill 
6
    Cotonang abbreviates Companhia Geral de Algodões de Angola. The main sha-
reholders were the Banco Nacional Ultramarino, Banque Josse Allard, Banco 
Burnay, Banque de Bruxelles, Fomento Geral de Angola, and Association Co-
tonnier de Belgique (untitled, BNU archives). A tax of 70 Angolares was imposed 
in 1930 with the creation of a Cotton Intendancy in Kassanje, and a 1928 law 
had expanded to Kassanje the regime of compulsory cotton cultivation hitherto 
enforced elsewhere in Angola, requiring each house to cultivate 20,000 plants 
on at least half a hectare, spaced 25 centimeters apart in lines 1 meter wide (see 
Diploma Legislativo 242; Diploma Legislativo 5 of 28 September 1928 expanded 
to Kassanje the Diploma Legislativo 638 of 24 September 1927, which in turn 
expanded to Luanda, Ambriz, Quissama, Porto Amboim, and Novo Redondo an 
earlier law focused on Icolo e Bengo, namely Portaria 760 of 21 November 1908 
that had required 2,500 cotton plants on at least a half hectare). Obligatory cul-
tivation was extended in Portaria 6916 of 1949 and Despacho of January 5, 1949, 
at 0.85 ha of cotton and 1 ha of food per family, and 0.25 ha each of cotton and 
food for elderly men and single women (these were apparently raised, but it is 
not clear when and which legislation). See also Beatriz (1918) on Icolo e Bengo. 
On the importance of taxes in motivating cotton cultivation by what were viewed 
in racist stereotypes as «lazy» Africans, see the report by Cotonang Director 
General Henrique Valdez (1932).
7
     The villages were Ganga Muchica (Nganga Muxika), Quivota (Kivota), Mulundo 
(Mulundu), and Gombe (Ngombe). See esp. «Instruções secretas: Às autorida-
des administrativas da Circunscrição do Cambo», Governador Júlio Monteiro 
Júnior, January 11, 1961 (AHU). On the discontent, see Freudenthal (1999: 279).
A
h
ar
on
 d
e 
G
ra
ss
i
58
them, that night a new mestiço Cotonang agent was killed when 
crossing into one of the resisting areas at night.8  
Soon throughout the Baixa, people blocked roads, damaged sto-
res and Cotonang and administrative buildings, and destroyed their 
identiﬁ cation cards and cotton seeds. They variously threatened to 
attack anyone who tried to force them to work for the company and 
the state, would not pay the annual head tax nor obey the local ad-
ministrator, and stated that they had been slaves of whites for 500 
years but were now free, and would only take orders from Kasavubu 
(the President of the Congo at that time) by way of his messenger 
Maria. The colonial government scrambled police and military for-
ces, but — wary of negative publicity, given the presence of journa-
lists in Luanda covering a hi-jacked sea liner, and impending deba-
tes at the United Nations about continued Portuguese colonialism 
and abusive labor practices — government ofﬁ cials ﬁ rst brieﬂ y tried 
talking with the protestors, which apparently only emboldened 
them. Ofﬁ cial reports show indications of the revolt then occurring 
quickly across various areas, initially around the northern center 
of the Baixa near Milando and the Lui River, and then indications 
of thousands of people mobilized across a large area of approxi-
mately 150 km by 200 km, involving dozens of towns and villages, 
stretching from near the Congo border and Kwango River around 
Tembo Aluma to south past Xa Muteba, and spanning from west of 
Bange Angola to east of Luremo.
Violent Portuguese military repression of the revolt lasted from 
early February through March at least, and consisted of two units 
from the Portuguese army, as well as air force surveillance and 
bombing raids.9 After a high-level meeting was held in Luanda on 
January 18th, and further monitoring and negotiations were held, 
an army unit was sent from Luanda to Malanje on February 4th. 
Another army unit had left from the provincial capital, and encounte-
red armed resistance, with bombing raids reported on February 5th. 
On February 8th they reported that some 10,000 armed Angolans 
8
    Martins, M. (1961) «Apontamento 14: Os incidents da Baixa de Cassange», 
January 30, p. 9; Informação 262, March 7, 1961, p. 2 (AHU).
9
    There were some Angolans listed in the 4th Companhia de Caçadores Especiais, 
though the timing of their participation is not clear. See «Livro de Efectivos da 
4CCE», at <http://4cce.org/photos/livro-efectivos-4cce-cpt-t-morais-ed.pdf>.
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10
  Martins, M. (1961), «Apontamento 34: Incidentes da Baixa de Cassange (II)», 
March 7, p. 15.
11
   Cann (2012: 515, 2015: 64) states unequivocally «For the mutineers there were 
243 deaths», citing EME (1998: 150), which cites the February 28 1961 Boletim 
de Informação of the 2a Rep/RMA for the period January 11 to February 27, re-
printed in Lara (1999: 684-693). However, a March 9 telegram from Angola’s 
Governor Geral to the Overseas Minister’s ofﬁ ce with the title «Malange Events 
— number of dead and injured» states that not only were there 243 deaths veri-
ﬁ ed directly, but also besides this there were deaths resulting from airplane atta-
cks that can’t be determined (AHU). Symptomatic of some of the difﬁ cult issues 
in accounting of fatalities, EME (1998) says nothing of the air bombing on Febru-
ary 18th around Marimba Anguengo, for which Freudenthal mentions possibly 
500 deaths, based on «Apontamento 34», p. 20, which reads, «A Companhia 
pede apoio aéreo sobre a povoação de Marimba Anguengo onde se encontram 
cerca de 500 indígenas com o cabecilha Gamboa (?)».
12
  Cann (2012: 509) also notes «The ofﬁ cer would ﬂ y with a box of grenades be-
tween his feet and, when required, drop one into the center of a threatening 
mob from the open window of the aircraft as it swooped low. On three days in 
February, the 18th, the 23rd, and the 24th, grenades were dropped, causing 
losses and panic in the bands of rebels. From the perspective of the ground for-
ces, this “bombing” had not been requested and proved counterproductive, as it 
caused many unwanted casualties». Cf. also the Portuguese unit veterans’ we-
bsite, «4.ª Companhia de Caçadores Especiais», <http://4cce.org/index.html>.
13
  See AHU, AHM reports, and «Relatório Perintrel, n.º 22/64 da SCCIA - Malange 
(Angola)» (PT/AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0408/01838).
in the revolt had gathered near Kunda dia Base.10 The precise total 
number of people killed during the revolt is disputed and appears 
to have been deliberately obfuscated by the Portuguese at the time 
with a low partial ﬁ gure of 243, which has sometimes been uncriti-
cally repeated.11 The actual rough number of Angolans killed is very 
likely in the thousands, but difﬁ cult to know particularly because of 
the indeterminate number killed by Portuguese bombing raids (re-
portedly of approximately 17 villages), with various estimates of fa-
talities ranging up to a perhaps improbable 30,000.12 Freudenthal 
(1999: 267) summarizes ﬁ gures of the toll of «7,795 injured, 4,876 
prisoners, [and] 5,524 Angolans shot down (men, women and chil-
dren)» (based on «Angolan testimonies» and citing a PIDE process).
Thousands more people ﬂ ed across the border to the Congo or 
were arrested or injured by the time the area had been re-conque-
red by the colonial government, at which point subsequent major 
connected nationalist armed revolts had also occurred in Luanda 
(February 4th) and in the coffee areas to the north and west of Ma-
lanje (March 15th onwards). The legacy of the revolt continued so-
mewhat across Malanje in the years immediately after the revolt in 
the form of dozens of minor political incidents and threats.13 And 
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14
  As João César Correia later recounted, «The people that ﬂ ed to the Congo, the so-
bas, Soba Marimba, Soba Chiquita, various sobas ﬂ ed with their people. Then 
we gathered together these people and mobilized them for a struggle capable of 
invading Angola [on March 15th]» (see «A Guerra», op. cit.). Such connections 
also contradict Macey’s (2012: 386-388) portrait of adventurism.
the nationalist armed struggle that began in Kassanje would conti-
nue in the broader region as some 10,000 refugees from the Baixa 
settled around the nearby Panzi District in the Congo and formed 
«a revolutionary support base for UPA [Union of Angolan Peoples] 
military operations back into Kasanje» (MARCUM 1969: 126).14 
Though the revolt occurred over 50 years ago, it is extremely re-
levant today, for three main reasons. The revolt informs popular 
debates about history and present problems in Angola, it sits at the 
center of academic and policy interpretations of political economy 
in Angola and Africa, and it suggests a rethink of some conceptually 
foundational work in African studies.
 
Figure 1. Map of the Baixa de Kassanje, c. 1960  
Sources: «Baixa de Cassange», Cotonang (AHU), Banco de Angola (1958)
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Figure 2. Cotton production, number of farmers, and area in Baixa 
de Kassanje, 1927-1960
 
nb: grey shaded = production (left axis, kg), dark grey = area (left axis, ha), 
light grey = number of producers (right axis)
Sources: Cotonang reports, DSPCFT (1938: 22), Valdez (1932), Anuário Estatístico, & 
Agricultural Services Bulletin. The graph retains the 1955-60 ﬁ gures for Camaxilo, which 
was transferred from Malanje to Lunda in 1955. The 1940-1942 numbers cultivators are 
estimates stated in Cotonang reports.
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1. The Baixa de Kassanje in debates and challen-
ges in Angola
Over recent years, prevailing discourses in Angola about the Bai-
xa de Kassanje revolt have begun to be revised, including by some 
state ofﬁ cials, to move away from prior depictions of the revolt as 
simply a massacre by brutal colonial Portuguese rulers of parochial 
peasants protesting about their particular economic grievances — a 
disconnected prelude to the start of the nationalist struggle in Lu-
anda on February 4th. The three problematic elements of this view 
are (1) the massacre was of more signiﬁ cance than the revolt, (2) the 
revolt was by isolated peasants or rural workers, and (3) the revolt 
was concerned only with particular economic grievances related to 
obligatory cotton cultivation in the Baixa de Kassanje. Some of the 
main tenor of this interpretation, which still often prevails, is illus-
trated in the statement issued by the ruling MPLA (the Popular Mo-
vement for the Liberation of Angola) party on the 50th anniversary 
of the revolt:
«[...] The response of the colonial system to the desire of the hum-
ble peasants of the Baixa de Kassanje to have a more digniﬁ ed life, 
based in better working conditions, resulted in an indiscriminate 
massacre by its Air Force, through dropping of “napalm” bombs.
That hideous act, from the mentors of the colonial system, pro-
voked a deepening of the consciousness of everyone who was already 
ﬁ ghting for the conquest of our liberty and motivated a greater cohe-
sion in the midst of the nationalist resistance groups, defrauding the 
willingness of the faithful servants of the colonial system and trans-
forming the Baixa de Kassanje uprising into a seed from which would 
sprout the ﬁ rst organized action, with political-military characteris-
tics, led by the heroic combatants of February 4th 1961 [...]».15
Post-colonial states emerging out of liberation movements so-
metimes grapple with harnessing, directing or limiting the potent 
15
  ANGOP (2011) «Press Release from the Political Bureau Secretariat of the MPLA 
relating to January 4th’, Jan 4», <http://www.portalangop.co.ao/angola/pt_
pt/noticias/politica/2011/0/1/Nota-Imprensa-Secretariado-Bureau-Político-
MPLA, 2e0e3061-7580-4e5e-9170-0c05409979ff.html>. It is hard here not to be 
reminded of Fanon (1963: 113, 114).
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signiﬁ cance of liberation rhetoric, histories, and claims. However, 
as the war years recede in Angola and public discussions increase, 
exclusive claims to nationalist origins have weakened in favor of 
recognizing various contributions made to the anti-colonial stru-
ggle, including by Kassanje peasants.16 In addition, the emphasis on 
colonial and foreign brutality has also given way to more of an ap-
preciation of the complex social transformations in Malanje.17 The 
rural concerns and family backgrounds of leading nationalist state 
ofﬁ cials have also gained publicity, particularly as the state grapples 
with trying to use oil revenues to boost agricultural development 
in order to reduce poverty and growing urban concentrations and 
to diversify the economy. In this respect, a nationalist recasting of 
the Kassanje revolt bolsters claims by current rural residents of the 
Baixa de Kassanje to a portion of the vast oil wealth, not to mention 
constituting an implicit critique of inequality.
For several years, plans for spectacular new projects in some 
areas of the revolt — including a model village, social centers, in-
frastructure, etc. — have been discussed, building on the yet un-
fulﬁ lled promises made by Angola’s ﬁ rst president on a visit to the 
area in August 1979.18 Such pronouncements of plans and projects 
serve as opportunities for publicity about purported commitment 
to rural development, but also are an ambivalent encounter in whi-
ch people make implicit (and sometimes explicit) critiques of the 
government’s lack of fulﬁ llment of obligations and prior promises, 
and even outright immoral enrichment. 
For example, in 2013 a historian was cited by the more indepen-
dent Radio Ecclesia, asserting continuity between the peasants’ 
struggle and current struggles for social justice and redistribution: 
«It is necessary that we continue to go for social justice, love for 
one’s neighbor, know how to share the riches of the country [...]».19 
16
 See perhaps Conceição Neto (1995) «Primeiro, primeiro, foi Janeiro: Guerra 
e “Memória”», Correio da Semana (Luanda), January, cited in Freudenthal 
(2012: 15). Cf. also fn. 13.
17
  Notable, for example, is Santos’ (2005) scholarship on the growth of the city of 
Malanje.
18
  Reported in Jornal de Angola.
19
 Even he, though, limits their grievances to «precarious life conditions». E.g. 
(2013) «Sobreviventes dos massacres da Baixa de Kassanje querem melhoria 
das condições de vida», Radio Ecclesia, Jan 4, <http://www.radioecclesia.org/
index.php?option=com_ﬂ exicontent&view=items&cid=198:sociedade&id=11-
809:sobreviventes-dos-massacres-da-baixa-de-kassanje-querem-melhoria-
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Similarly, a spokesman for National Association for the Baixa de 
Kassanje stated that people there were requesting solutions to 
many problems, including «potable water, schools, health services, 
roads, bridges, rehabilitation of infrastructures supporting cotton 
production that have been inactive for half a century». He noted 
speciﬁ cally:
«The construction of primary and secondary schools, as well as 
intermediate institutes, the construction of municipal hospitals and 
maternity wards, construction of adequate social housing for the 
community with more than 60 years, the implantation of the pro-
gram ‘water for all’ and basic sanitation in the whole region. The 
registration of survivors of the struggle against colonial repression, 
January 4th 1961, in the process of integration in the class of veterans 
for the pension fund».
And the secretary of information for the main opposition party, 
UNITA, was summarized as saying «that the commemoration was 
a homage to all who fought against colonialism and for national 
independence», and he went on to say, in what could be read as an 
implicit critique of government inaction, «We now have to have 
capacity to give dignity to the survivors of this act. In the last few 
years people have made [this] manifest, asking for greater dignity 
for the survivors and inhabitants of that region».20 
In addition to debates over nature of the revolt, the aftermath 
of the revolt is also critical to understanding contemporary plans 
and practices of reconstruction and development. There was subse-
quently a major push by the Portuguese to promote regional develo-
pment projects to appease grievances and avoid nationalist sympa-
thies, to mechanize cotton production and thereby lessen reliance 
on indigenous labor, as well as to construct massive amounts of new 
 -das condições de vida», Radio Ecclesia, Jan 4, <http://www.radioecclesia.org/
index.php?option=com_ﬂ exicontent&view=items&cid=198:sociedade&id=1180-
9:sobreviventes-dos-massacres-da-baixa-de-kassanje-querem-melhoria-das--
-condicoes-de-vida&Itemid=716#.UxPIkoWKiFc>; Soares, Isaías (2011) «Há 
descontentamento na Baixa de Kassange», Voice of America, Jan 5, <http://
www.voaportugues.com/content/article-01-04-2010-baixadokassange-voa-
news-112882484/1259240.html>; (2011) «Projecto piloto não vingou», O País 
(Luanda), Aug. 22. 
20  ANGOP (2007) «04 de Janeiro de 1961 catapultou os nacionalistas para o 
movimento libertador», Jan 3.
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roads for marketing and counter-insurgency military logistics. The-
se extensive development plans that emerged as a colonial response 
to this revolt, the others, and the general launch of armed liberation 
struggle have been picked up by the post-colonial government since 
the end of the war in 2002 as inﬂ uential guides for funneling billions 
of dollars of oil revenue into reconstruction and rural development.
In sum, the discussion over the character of the revolt is also a 
proxy for other debates, including about moral claims to dignity 
and a share in national development. The revolt’s aftermath shaped 
current plans for reconstruction and development, which are also 
occasions for these continued debates.
1.1. Academic and policy interpretations of political eco-
nomy in Angola and Africa
Many academic analyses have uncritically repeated the narrow 
economic or Portuguese propaganda-inﬂ uenced interpretations of 
the Baixa de Kassanje and the revolt. Moorman’s (2008) otherwise 
excellent social history, for example, says that Malanje cotton pro-
ducers «rebelled against the system of forced cotton production» 
(81) but says nothing of their nationalist aims. A popular tourist gui-
de to Angola notes that the revolt was by «workers» who «protes-
ted violently against appalling working conditions and forced la-
bour» (295). The pastor Malcom McVeigh (1961), seeking to garner 
sympathy for purportedly innocent and humble peasants, explicitly 
denied political overtones: «It is a mistake to consider these [MPLA 
and UPA] foreign or Communist movements [...]. It was a spon-
taneous demonstration against abusive practices by the Cottonag 
[sic] Company [...]».21 For many years one of the best textbooks on 
Angolan history was that of Wheeler and Pélissier (1971: 174), which 
notes in passing the possibility of political, religious, and Congolese 
inﬂ uence, but the book generally portrayed the revolt simply as «an 
act of deﬁ ance against the system of obligatory cotton cultivation 
for which Cotonang, a monopolist company, had the concession in 
21  
UPA is União das Populações de Angola, a group amongst others that emer-
ged in northern Angola, Luanda, and the Congo, and would become the FNLA 
(Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola), led by Holden Roberto (MARCUM 
1969).
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the region east of Malanje […]. This was a rebellion of poverty; 
it failed because the rebels lacked arms and leaders and support 
from neighbouring tribes». Newitt (1981: 228-229) cites Pélisser 
(1978) to dismiss the revolt as a «peasant jacquerie» that was done 
by «local groups», was «almost totally unorganized», and «took 
the nationalist leaders as well as the authorities unawares».22 One 
of the most esteemed detailed analyses of the conditions leading up 
to 1961, Christine Messiant’s 1983 doctoral thesis likewise inaccu-
rately describes, 
«degraded by misery, traditional society there was preserved, and 
this preservation, given the specter of famine, can explain why the 
revolt extended, at the beginning of 1961, to the whole region. Without 
local cadres, without connections with the movements that developed 
at the time in the Congo and Luanda, the revolt would be crushed 
[…] [T]he Baixa […] [was] an enclave of pure exploitation where only 
a revolt without hope or escape was possible» (MESSIANT 1983: 263, 
emph. added).23 
And Marcum’s (1969) otherwise brilliant and extensive chronicle 
calls the uprising «spontaneous and localized» (126), while Cann’s 
(2015: 65) recent but problematic account also calls it «sponta-
neous and localized».24 
22 He writes «nationalist leaders were entirely taken by surprise when urban 
guerrillas began action in Luanda and when a peasant jacquerie broke out 
in the Baixa de Cassange cotton growing region in 1961. To this day no one 
really knows which group, if any, had a hand in organising these risings. Ho-
wever the exiled nationalist leaders hastened to claim credit for the action, to 
claim their responsibility and to try to use the events to their advantage. But 
it was all very much being wise after the event».
23 Messiant cites Pélissier (1978: 409-424) what she says is «isolation from natio-
nalist organizations, by which it was certainly not organized, although there 
has been, through men including a messianic leader, Congolese inﬂ uences».
24 Birmingham (1992: 35) mentions only rural «anti-colonial despair». He mo-
reover erroneously puts Kassanje in the east of Angola, and says the revolt 
had been contained by the police in January (but it was the army who did the 
repression, and they actually only arrived in February). See also Wright (1997: 
60), who says the March coffee revolt was in the «Baixa de Cassange». Symp-
tomatically, Soares de Oliveira (2015: 220), despite the present author’s direct 
communication on this point, nevertheless erroneously writes that the revolt 
was by cotton «workers», conﬁ nes it to January, and states that it «seems to 
have been similarly unrelated to the liberation movements» (referencing 
KEESE 2004).
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The nuances of contemporary Angolan debates discussed in the 
previous section about the meaning of the revolt in relation to cur-
rent projects are not sufﬁ ciently appreciated in most academic and 
policy interpretations of Angola’s political economy. Perhaps this is 
partly because of a lack of sensitive on-the-ground study in Angola 
outside of Luanda.25 
Perhaps more important though is the problematic framework 
used to understand political economy in Angola, which is then of-
ten depicted as a particularly extreme or clear example of dynamics 
that are characteristic of Africa more broadly (See page 30). The 
essential dynamic is usually perceived as one of a neopatrimonial-
rentier-gatekeeper state, in which a regime of cosmopolitan state, 
party, and business elites in the coastal capital cities proﬁ t by con-
trolling trade and the proceeds of allocating valuable enclaves to 
foreign companies, and retain power by using such wealth to buy 
off political support through selective patronage, repression where 
needed, and otherwise neglect of the mass of low-productivity far-
mers. In this sense, the delimited foreign cotton concession cove-
ring the Baixa de Kassanje, would be understood as a prototypical 
enclave. An indicative account for Angola that builds on many of the 
above approaches and speciﬁ cally cites the Kassanje cotton area is 
given by Soares de Oliveira (2013: 168):
«the Portuguese systematically resorted to the “discharge” of state 
responsibilities […]. The Portuguese also gave concessions to private 
corporations that became de facto sovereigns within their domains 
of extraction […] the administrative and ﬁ nancial means to replace 
them did not exist. Three companies stood out: CCFB, which ran the 
Benguela railway, Cotonang, the cotton ﬁ rm in Malange [sic] dis-
trict; and above all, Diamang, the multinational mining consortium 
in Lunda district».26 
25  Ferguson (2005: 381), for example, notes, «The highly simpliﬁ ed sketch I pre-
sent here has its uses (I hope), but it cannot stand in for the detailed ethno-
graphic accounts that, one hopes, will soon help to give us a more ﬂ eshed-out 
picture of the social and political life of African mineral-extraction enclaves».
26 Likewise, Cooper (2002) makes no mention of Kassanje. And Reno’s (2011) 
history of warfare discusses Angola (pp. 64-67), but ignores Kassanje and 
otherwise confuses facts and chronology of the 1961 revolts. On concessionary 
politics more generally, cf. Hardin (2011).
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Consequently, a critical rethinking of such portrayals of the Baixa 
de Kassanje and the revolt has much broader implications for the-
ory and practice in Angola and Africa.
2. Reconsidering Angola’s Baixa de Kassanje 
and 1961 revolt: A crossroads in transformation
Malanje’s role as a transforming crossroads gave rise to the 
revolt as the beginning of armed nationalist struggle. The revolt 
was shaped by complex, intensive, long-standing socio-political 
relations with the Congo (which achieved independence six mon-
ths prior, in June 1960), but accounts of the Baixa de Kassanje 
revolt have downplayed these relations, ignored them, or de-
picted them as simply «outside agitation». Connections betwe-
en Malanje and Luanda were also key to the revolt, and though 
sometimes recognized, the extent and nature of these relations 
have also been under-appreciated. The revolt was also shaped by 
profound transformations in Malanje and the Baixa de Kassan-
je, which have not yet been closely analyzed. The argument the-
refore contributes to several different discussions — about the 
origins of nationalist struggle in Angola, about space in African 
political economy, and about the contributions and character of 
relational geographies.
The discussed relations are not simply between cities as discre-
te points, but rather I conceptualize these places and others using 
an expansive notion of place. Places are not entirely circumscribed 
points connected linearly somehow through an ether, but rather 
are constituted through the grounded sets of geographies — for 
example, heading inland east from Luanda, the cotton area of 
Catete, the sugar plantations in Caxito, racialized coffee hills of 
Dembos, the Dondo market center, the American mission at Kes-
sua, the fort and mines at Pungo Andongo, etc. I emphasize the 
multiple connective places through which the concentrations in 
Luanda, Malanje and Congo are related. I then hope to identify 
some of the key turning points in transformations of the processes 
by which Luanda and Malanje have related to one another through 
these spaces.
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3. Malanje-Congo relations
Before turning to Malanje-Luanda relations, I want to emphasize 
various sorts of relations between the regions of Malanje and sou-
thern Congo. Like the above critique of discrete notions of Malanje 
and Luanda as circumscribed cities, my analysis of Congo-Malanje 
relations is also partly a critique of notions of discrete socio-spa-
tial distinctions between what has been called a relatively homoge-
nous Kimbundu-speaking «Mbundu complex», contrasted with a 
Bakongo society to the north west, a Lunda-Chokwe society to the 
north east, and an Ovimbundu society to the south. As above, I am 
not conceptualizing a distinct Mbundu society that interacts with 
other societies. Rather, I am examining speciﬁ c relations through 
which shifting groupings of people are (re-)formed and contested. 
As above, I analyze the relations of two places — Kinshasa (which 
the Belgians called Leopoldville) and Malanje — through analysis 
of processes producing other geographies, including those of smal-
ler towns such as Kikwit, Tembo Aluma, and Marimba, and shif-
ting ethnic-political formations (Bapende, Maholo, Mussuco, Jin-
ga, Bondo, Imbangala, etc.). The relations between Kinshasa and 
Malanje that I emphasize are labor migration, political and social 
dynamics (pre-colonial formations, churches, political parties, etc), 
and commodity trade (rubber, palm oil, cotton, consumer goods, etc). 
These spatial relations involved three historical turning points. 
In the late 1910s and the 1920s battles over trade routes and co-
lonial occupation («paciﬁ cation») shifted towards more extensive 
colonial presence and labor and tax exactions. The second turning 
point came after decades of these exactions as World War II and 
associated market disruption preoccupied colonial governments 
and ﬁ nance, and some people left the Angolan areas of cotton in-
tensiﬁ cation for the Congo, whilst others in the Congo sought refuge 
in Angola or in Kinshasa from Belgian exactions (others went to 
Angolan cities). The ﬁ nal key turning point came with the Congo’s 
transition to independence in 1959-1960 and the related rise of An-
golan nationalism, in which the deep and wide regional relations of 
labor migration and socio-political ties took on a distinct character 
of active, coordinated political mobilization.
The connections between Malanje and the Congo were interpre-
ted in particular, delicate ways by both nationalist forces and the 
Portuguese colonial regime. The colonial regime sought to portray 
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the revolt as easily swayed tribes duped by outside communist agi-
tators from the Congo, thereby playing upon Cold War fears and tro-
pes of peasant passivity and naïveté, whilst careful to not hint at too 
great a weakness of territorial control by the colonial state. Nationa-
lists in exile sought to also portray their shadow administrations as 
coherent and informed, whilst emphasizing the victimization of the 
peasants by the brutal colonial regime in order to mobilize interna-
tional action and support for their nascent government in exile.
Sobas and leaders of the revolt were reported by colonial ofﬁ -
cials to have expressed in unequivocal terms that they were in tou-
ch with «Pessa», that is, P.S.A., or the Parti Solidaire Africain, a 
Congolese political party that had boomed in the southern Con-
golese districts bordering on Malanje Province during the run-up 
to Congo’s independence in June 1960. People in the Baixa had 
PSA calendars with the distinctive serpent and tree emblem, and 
reported receiving orders from PSA and Kasavubu via an interme-
diary Maria.27  
The role of PSA however has gone relatively un-examined in ac-
counts of Kassanje, despite a remarkable 1967 book by Herbert 
Weiss who used extensive travels and close cooperation to describe 
in detail the party’s rise. The PSA was buoyed by popular discontent 
with rural Belgian colonial administration and, after riots in 1959 in 
the capital Léopoldville (Kinshasa), the forcible re-location of po-
liticized urban youth back to their villages (See also LAMAL 1954). 
Weiss is at pains to point out that the PSA, led by the leftist Antoine 
Gizenga and Maoist Pierre Mulele (who would go one to lead wi-
despread rural rebellions in 1964), was at ﬁ rst somewhat elitist and 
tentative, but the level of popular discontent exceeded the ability of 
the party leaders to conservatively channel it — «the leaders’ hands 
were forced by local occurrences» (229). In manners very similar 
to the subsequent Kassanje revolt, rural people of the Kwango and 
27  For example, soba Bumba reportedly stated, «All this “confusion” is not ours. 
We don’t want anything to do with you whites, leave us alone to live our lives. 
Today, we only obey Kasavubu whose orders come to us by emissaries [...] If 
you whites want war don’t do anything to us but rather to Pessa, Maria, and 
Kasavubu who are responsible for everything. You can kill us but we are in-
nocent. This was the order that came to us from Fatim who created the world 
and all the people white and black. The General Governor of whom you speak 
should try to reach an understanding with Kasavubu [...] We are not the ones 
inventing anything and we only comply with orders». See Teixeira, op. cit.
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Kwilu districts in the neighboring Congo embraced PSA and refused 
to obey Belgian orders, pay taxes, perform obligatory labor, show 
respect, and so on (See also CANN 2015: 54). Weiss presciently re-
cognized that such «rural radicalism» «clearly runs counter to the 
received view of the process of decolonization in Asia and Africa» 
(293), but such insight has thereafter been largely unappreciated 
by academics.28 However, some recent revisionist work on Came-
roon, for example, draws together newly available archives and has 
illustrated the extensive deliberately cosmopolitan geographies of 
nationalist rural mobilization (TERRETTA 2013). To understand the 
ways by which the PSA, Kasavubu, Lumumba, and other aspects of 
Congolese independence came to have such an importance in Ma-
lanje requires examining the region’s deep historical and geogra-
phical connections through kinship, political rule, and trade.
It is worth brieﬂ y foreshadowing that Congo-Malanje relations 
were also shaped by nationalists’ networks that stretched both 
through Malanje to the Congo and from Luanda to the Congo and 
back down to Malanje. Key here was the ﬁ gure of Malanje-born An-
dre Rosário Neto (discussed more in the next sub-section). Rosá-
rio Neto was a civil servant in ﬁ nance and part-time journalist who 
studied in a church seminary in the Baixa de Kassanje, and then 
cultivated relationships with nationalists in Luanda during semi-
nary school there, and subsequently joined the Union of People of 
Angola (UPA) in the Congo in June 1960, where he produced and 
translated from French into Portuguese and Kimbundu radio pro-
grams and printed newspapers and propaganda to reach Malanje 
and nearby areas (e.g. Figure 3).29 
28 Boone (2013: 44) is exceptionally right to mention this work.
29 See for example some of Neto’s articles in Angola Norte: «30 dias em Malange», 
1948/09/25, «A juventude de Malange e o cinema» 1949/04/02, «Um sinto-
ma feliz: Uanga» 1951/09/02, and «Já nasceu o menino Deus» 1951/12/22. 
The role of Neto’s wife, Maria da Conceição, remains to be investigated, though 
she headed the women’s wing of the FNLA in 1963 at least (CHILCOTE 1972: 108-
-9). The PSA was sympathetic to but also aimed to be broader than Lumumba’s 
Mouvement National Congolais. Lumumba authorized weekly UPA broadcasts 
on Radio Léopoldville starting August 3, 1960, which emphasized unity, and 
distinguished between the Portuguese government and settlers (MARCUM 
1969: 80). Cleveland (2008: 209-10) also mentions that diamond workers in 
the north-east would listen to Congolese and liberation movement radio 
broadcasts from the Congo (more so in the 1960s).
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The point of the below excerpt reprinted from this newspaper is 
to illustrate how what was supposedly a parochial Mbundu cotton 
worker revolt involved ﬁ gures such as Neto who had links to the 
Congo and worked with people of different ethnicities and were ke-
enly tuned in to broader global anti-colonial movements and cons-
ciousness.
  Figure 3. Transnational news in  Figure 4. PSA Emblem
Kimbundu in La Nation Angolaise
 
   Source: La Nation Angolaise (Kinshasa),  Source: Solidarité Africaine,
                       30-04-1962, p. 13           March 18, 1960, p.11.
Central to the cross-border aspect of the Kassanje revolt is the 
role of a motley group of people called Suku. A critical examination 
of their reiﬁ cation helps illuminate the complex socio-spatial regio-
nal geographies that both resulted from and facilitated decades of 
movement and relations, and eventually enabled the cross-border 
anti-colonial mobilization. One group of Suku resided predominan-
tly north of the Angola-Congo border, and another straddled the 
national border.30 Both groups traced their lineage back to the old 
Seventeenth Century Congo Kingdom to the west (the «Musucu» 
were mentioned in a February 1535 letter by King Alfonso of the 
Congo to the Pope). The southern Suku came to be governed by a 




Source: La Nation Angolaise (Kinshasa), 30-04-
62, p. 13 



Source: Solidarité Africaine, March 



30 On the border formation, see Vellut (2006).
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queen (called the Ngudi a Nkama), following the military victory in 
the 18th Century over Lunda groups to the east by the sister of the 
king of the northern Suku.31 The subsequent descendent 8th Queen 
of the southern Suku, newly crowned in 1958 for being less fearful, 
is repeatedly mentioned in the 1961 colonial reports as identiﬁ ed by 
Angolans as a key agitator of the Kassanje revolt.32 
Figure 5. Kabete, the sixth Ngudi a Nkama of the Suku (top two); 
a later Ngudi a Nkama; and the contemporary Ngudi a Nkama, 
Henriqueta Maria Mpangu
    
    
Sources: Cancela (1922a: 126), Mouta (1934: 211); Gabriel (1982: 241); JA (2012)
31 See esp. Lamal (1965), and also Thissen (1965); Redinha (1971b), see also Bour-
geois (1985).
32 The eighth Queen, Kamwangu, was invested in 1958, replacing her cousin, Kana-
di, who reportedly was «eliminated» for being too «fearful» [craintive] (LAMAL 
1965: 73). See Martins, M. (1961) «Apontamento 34: Incidentes da Baixa de Cas-
sange (II)», March 7, p. 38, AHU.



 
 
Sources: Cancela (1922a: 126), Mouta (1934: 211); Gabriel (1982: 241); JA (2012) 


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In various colonial reports on the revolt, Angolans were said to 
have associated Nguri a Nkama with «Maria», a name she was re-
portedly baptized with at the old Catholic Mussuco mission at Lu-
remo after returning from newly independent Congo.33 Angolans 
near the initial unrest at Milando as early as January 13th mention 
Maria in Kasule Kwenda (some 70 km to their south east), sugges-
ting that by then the Ngudi a Nkama had been there, possibly trave-
ling through Kulashingo (Kulaxingu), across the sparsely inhabited 
forested hills and then to the east of the Kwango River. Indeed, at 
the Kwango town, near Kasule Kwenda, by February 5th and 6th 
there was mention of an agitator from the Congo, and Angolans at 
Kwango also refused to plant cotton, while some 600 Angolans the-
reabouts had by then abandoned their work at the nearby burgeo-
ning diamond operations on the Kwango River. Understanding the 
gendered roles of the Suku in trans-border trans-ethnic nationalist 
mobilization is thus key.34 
The important role of Suku also must be understood in relation to 
the complex shifting ethnic makeup of the region. The major ethnic 
group singled out by the Portuguese and Cotonang as agitators of the 
Kassanje revolt was actually the Holo, who trace their lineage not to 
the Congo kingdom to the east, but rather to the Kimbundu-speaking 
33 There was also perhaps an elision of Ngudi a, Nguri a, Muria, and Maria (one 
report by a long-time ofﬁ cer in the area writes, «Múria-cama»). See Teixeira, 
op. cit. Other names mentioned are Maria do Cassuloquenda and Maria de 
N’Guriakama (Informação 262, p. 3). Freudenthal (1999) mentions some of 
this, but doesn’t engage the important work by Lamal.
34 Such dynamics also shed light on the real limitations of the approach of Ko-
pytoff, who conducted his dissertation ﬁ eldwork on lineage and religion amon-
gst the northern Suku. Informação 145, February 6th 1961 (AHU); Informação 
765, reproduction of Apontamento by Jose Torres Palma, Catholic mission 
at Mussuco. «Movimento religioso-político na margem esquerda do Cuango, 
Posto de Milando», January 1961. See also the sources in Freudenthal (1999). 
Further research is needed on the relevance to the revolt’s gendered discourses 
and organization of the gendered and domestic education at the Mussuco mis-
sion (where girls began schooling in 1921, and nuns arrived in 1926). Schmidt’s 
(2005) work on gender and popular nationalist mobilization in Guinea also 
has insights for and important connections with Kassanje. The PSA that was 
so inﬂ uential to Kassanje was shaped by an encounter in Guinea between PSA 
leader Antoine Gizenga and his future wife, Andrée Blouin, an energetic and 
cosmopolitan woman from the Cuilo area, and also an «accomplished ora-
tor» who spoke the local language. Blouin was in Guinea in the late 1950s and 
«strongly identiﬁ ed with the independence struggle» there, returning to the 
Kinshasa hinterlands in March 1960 to found PSA’s women’s wing, shortly be-
fore the Nguri a Nkama arrived in the Congo (WEISS 1967: 177-178).
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groups to the south.35 Yet despite persistent colonial efforts at eth-
nic codiﬁ cation and mapping in order to facilitate forced labor, both 
Suku and Holo, however, have generatively combined, merged and 
differentiated various linguistic, cultural and socio-political aspects 
from broader Kimbundu- and Kikongo-speaking social groups (See 
also VELLUT 1972, 2006; VIEIRA-MARTINEZ 2006; ATKINS 1955). 
There are, moreover, other related smaller groups, such as Kadi, 
Paka, Koxi, as well as larger bordering Ngola, Jinga, Xinji, and Lun-
da. Over a dozen different maps since the late Nineteenth Century 
show these groups in overlapping and/or shifting areas or zones, 
including both neighboring villages and ethnically mixed villages 
(CARVALHO 1890: 118; VALLE and CASTRO 1908; DINIZ 1918; CAN-
CELA 1922b: 126; JMGIC 1948; VICENTE 1959; THISSEN 1960; DENIS 
1962; NICOLAÏ 1963; LAMAL 1965: 68; SALAZAR 1968; MILHEIROS 
1967; CARDOSO 1970; REDINHA 1971a).36 And colonial reports on the 
revolt clearly mention the adherence also to the revolt of the most 
prestigious chiefdoms of Jingas, Bondos and Bangalas.37 This stan-
ds in stark contrast to now crude-looking portrayals by some com-
mentators, scholars or analysts that map the liberation movement 
parties MPLA and UPA/FNLA onto discrete, ﬁ xed ethnic blocs of «the 
Kimbundu» or «the Bakongo».38  
Part of the explanation why some of scholars cited above did not 
recognize such support and connections between different ethnic 
groups, and emphasized the lack of support and connections, was 
35 See also Vicente «A situação actual da zona da “Tribu Holo”», do sector de 
Cunda Ria Baza e dos Postos de Milando e Tembo Aluma, AHU, 01/30/61, and 
Cann (2015: 53-54).
36 See also the c.1961 map of Holos, Gingas, Bondos, Bangalas, and Songos in AHU 
c. p. 194; p. 12 of (1970) «Elementos sobre a etnia Jinga da Baixa de Cassan-
ge», PT/TT/SCCIA/007/0005. Diniz (1918: 187) states that Mussuco region is 
«limited in the north by the Utungila River [...] and to the West by the Kuango 
River», but other maps put Mussuco on both sides of the Kwango, as well as 
putting Holo extending East of the Kwango.
37 Carvalho, J. (1961) «Situação na Baixa de Cassange», Letter to Administrador-
Delgado, February 17 (AHU). Marcum (1969: 126) paraphrases Neto’s (1966) 
mention of the signiﬁ cant arrest in March of Kulashingo (Kulaxingu), the King 
of the Bangalas.
38 The history of ethnogenesis in Angola still remains to be told, but a key part 
has to do with the efforts at taxation and labor recruitment by Diniz, and then 
«scientiﬁ c occupation» by the Junta de Investigação do Ultramar and the Ins-
tituto de Investigação Cientíﬁ ca de Angola, cataloguing ethnic groups, and 
hence the resulting static map of neat bounded ethnic units merits scrutiny 
rather than casual invocation (see DEGRASSI 2015).
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because that was how colonial Portuguese propaganda deliberately 
sought to obfuscate the revolt in the tense context of the Cold War, 
United Nations hearings and national independence movements. 
In particular, Angola’s Governor General wrote to the Overseas 
Minister’s Ofﬁ ce on March 9th that the Kassanje revolt «could be 
presented as a ﬁ ght between tribes for external inﬂ uence in which 
the Army intervened to defend the injured and peaceful», and Lis-
bon swiftly drafted a press statement to such effect, which was then 
repeated in major international newspapers.39 
In contrast, at work behind the actual shifting, layered mix of 
relations between people that facilitated trans-national political 
mobilization were a series of longer-standing social, economic, cul-
tural and political processes.40 The area’s dynamics took shape in 
particular as a key slaving hinterland from the Seventeenth through 
the Nineteenth Centuries, using control over the Kwango River, and 
with the Holo also controlling salt pans on the Lui River (See LAMAL 
1965: 70).41 However, at the end of the Nineteenth Century, as the 
Portuguese sought to establish «effective occupation» following the 
Berlin Conference, it was with the Suku queen Ngudi a Nkama that 
state-sanctioned missionaries established relations (THISSEN 1960). 
There followed booming rubber trade until the market collapsed 
around 1909 and then large-scale (but by no means complete) mi-
gration and displacement related to colonial military campaigns of 
occupation that sought to establish political-administrative control 
in order to allow a census of the population that would facilitate 
collection of taxes and mobilization of labor for infrastructure and 
39 On March 11th the New York Times reported, «A Ministry statement said the 
“inter-tribal” ﬁ ghts broke out last month in the Malange district [...]», «Lis-
bon Reports Disorders», p. 2.
40 These processes are largely excluded from the static structural-functionalist 
approach that Kopytoff (1987) deployed. Indeed, Kopytoff’s (1960) thesis, re-
liant on close collaboration with colonial authorities, only includes a single foo-
tnote noting famines in the late 1930s and early 1940s due to obligatory labor 
(p. 52). Cf. Holeman (1954). Likewise, Kopytoff’s (1965) subsequent proﬁ le of 
the Suku devotes a few pages to colonialism and change, but mostly to dismiss 
the effects of migrant labor on the structure of the local economy and society.
41 Holo were able to break off from the southern Kassanje formations in the late 
Seventeenth Century in order to control Kwango river crossings, and grew po-
werful from 1730s to the 1760s by diverting early slave trade from the east 
southwards, as well as mediating trade for French goods through the Congo 
port until trade shifted back southwards to Luanda as the French became 
pre-occupied with the Napoleonic wars (MILLER 1988).
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construction projects and agricultural production, which are dis-
cussed more in the next sub-section.42 What is key in all this is that 
rather than migration constituting an «exit option» to some other 
comparable abstract unit of land (à la Kopytoff), migration inste-
ad entailed a shifting relationship to both ﬁ xed resources and sets 
of social relations, and this would eventually facilitate anti-colonial 
organizing and the Kassanje revolt.43 
 
Figure 6. Kabongo, the Holo  Figure 7. Salt Flats at Kiongwa River, 
Queen «Holo diya Mukhetu»      South of Kizenga & Milando,
               10 km East of Lui River
 
      Source: Maesen (1956: 6)          Source: Gouveia (1956: 165)
The turbulence of colonial conquest also was interpreted meta-
physically with speciﬁ c ritual practices that would be resuscitated 
during the 1961 revolt.44 The Kifumbi ﬁ gure, for example, is reported 
42 See Pélissier (1986) on the military campaigns. See von Oppen (1993), and Can-
cela (1923), and Osório Junior, Vaz (1921) «Relatório da coluna de operações a 
“Uamba até Tembo Aluma», Arquivo Histórico Militar (AHM) 2/2/59/40.tituto 
de Investigação Cientíﬁ ca de Angola, cataloguing ethnic groups, and hence the 
resulting static map of neat bounded ethnic units merits scrutiny rather than 
casual invocation (see DEGRASSI 2015).
43 Also worth noting is that careful research by Cameroonian scholars has sho-
wn that there was actually also signiﬁ cant ongoing peasant unrest in Aghem 
Cameroon while Kopytoff was doing the ﬁ eldwork there that shaped his thesis 
on «exit» and «internal frontiers» in Africa, though he does not mention such 
protest and discounts the importance of African researchers (KOPYTOFF 1977, 
1981, 1995; MBAH 2009; KAH 2009).
44 Around Mussuco in 1915-1923, there was hunger due to a disease outbreak 
amongst livestock (COSTA 1970: 136), and something similar was reported 
in Holo areas (MAESEN 1956: 5). In 1916, in Mussuco there was a rumor of a
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 strange person, Mafulu, that had come from the Congo and had only one eye, 
one arm, and one leg, and would appear in the rivers and order the sacriﬁ ce 
of white cattle, sheep and chickens; one would then drink a potion to suppress 
spells and give immortality to honest people (GABRIEL 1982: 160). The new li-
vestock capture and trade patterns appear to have brought new diseases, which 
were interpreted in relation to the military campaigns and millenarian visions; 
these practices were then resuscitated in 1961 in different form. This appears 
to be related to the spread of Kimbanguism, and a Mafulu revolt in 1918. Ma-
fulu was also a term for a missionary. In 1928 in Sanza Pombo and Damba, 
there were similar notions of the apparition of a (white) person Mafulu from 
the river waters and killing of white livestock were present in revolts in Damba 
and Sanza Pombo (SANTOS 1972: 307).
45 The spelling varies: kifumbe, quifumbe, quifombo, kifumbi, etc. Thissen 
(1960: 170) interestingly discusses mvumbi as a sort of «semi-material» spi-
rit, spelling it also as nzumbi, which in turn perhaps parses out to nzambi and 
the more well-known English zombie. Esteves (2008: 112) also notes versions 
in Kikongo (kifumba), Umbundu (katokhõla), chokwe (thalyanga). However, 
Ribas (1969: 307) gives the root as kufumba (to damage), and describes it as a 
rural brigand or highwayman (bandoleiro) who would decapitate people.
in some Nineteenth Century accounts with ritual sacriﬁ ce of human 
hearts, but its meaning shifted closely in relation to the forced labor 
associated with colonial spatial-economic transformation.45 Kifum-
bi haunted the rural paths hidden in tall grasses and would capture 
people to use the oils of brains, in varying accounts, for the engines 
of the labor-intensive industries to which many people were forci-
bly rounded up and sent without return: railroads, sugar factories, 
diamond machinery, or plantation equipment (ESTEVES 2008). The 
Kifumbi illustrate metaphysically some of the long-term and exten-
sive transformations and responses that shaped the region and lead 
to the particular form of the revolt, rather than a simple reﬂ ex to the 
economic conditions of cotton work.
In contrast to the notion that the Baixa was simply delegated to 
management by a foreign company, there was increasingly intensi-
ve government presence during and after decades of Portuguese mi-
litary-administrative occupation, and an associated history of pro-
test against such presence, even in the far northern reaches along 
the Congo border. Government interest had included, for example, 
designating a Holo and Jinga district as early as the 1850s, national 
border demarcation in the 1890s, and then opening of military posts 
at Mussuco in 1898 and Tembo Aluma in 1903, followed by years of 
conquest campaigns (ANON 1903; ANON 1910; SARMENTO 1916; GAGO 
1921; OSÓRIO JUNIOR 1921; MILHEIROS 1972). Then came non-mi-
litary activities — for example, taxation, labor recruitment, a study 
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expedition in 1925, plans for a train line, inventories of peasant 
holdings, phytosanitary measures against locusts, etc. (See DINIZ 
1929; ALBERTO 1928).46 
This growing government presence operated in increasingly clo-
se collaboration with Cotonang — detailed in section 5 below — to 
such an extent that the many of the practices of revolt were expli-
citly addressed not simply at cotton company practices but also at 
administrative measures. For example, although a compulsory na-
tional census (with stiff ﬁ nes for non-compliance) was supposed to 
be carried out in January of 1961 (preparatory surveys had already 
covered the country), at that time the Queen Ngudi a Nkama sought 
to substitute for this authoritative colonial practice of censusing by 
ordering people to not obey, and to instead gather and be counted 
for her (presumably for propaganda and enlistment in the revolt) 
(PALMA op. cit.).47  This continued decades of revolts, passive resis-
tance and migration against censusing for tax and labor ever since 
military occupation in the early 1900s-1920s.48 It was only ﬁ tting 
that the 1960 Christmas Eve front page edition of the Malanje colo-
nial elite’s newspaper featured both the modernist questions «How 
Many Were We? How Many Are We?» and, a smaller type-faced 
article headline titled simply «Communism».
Similar processes were likewise unfolding unevenly across the 
border in the Belgian Congo (DENIS 1962). By the 1930s these state-
corporate exactions in parts of the Congo region had reached such 
an extent that they provoked a rebellion in areas with Pende, where 
some 500 people were killed by the Belgian army, and many others 
brought stories of the events as they subsequently crossed over to 
Angola where relatives lived (VANDERSTAETEN 2001). These proces-
ses also lead to migration from border areas of the Congo to urban 
centers such as Kinshasa and Matadi, as well as colonial projects 
46 Bebiano, José Bacelar (1926) «Observações geológicas e apontamentos sobre 
a ﬂ ora, fauna e etnologia da fronteira nordeste de Angola», Boletim Geral do 
Ultramar (BGU) 11, pp. 34-59. See also (1954) BGU n.º 353-354, p. 265; (1934) 
BGU n.º 103; (1934) BGU n.º 122-123, p. 123. One can also chart the detailed 
administrative presence in the number of papers in the archives (which do 
vary over the years), as well as the increase in the administrative divisions (see 
Figure 18).
47 See also DSEEG (1967), and Martins 1961, op. cit., p. 3, who also notes some 
people had gone to Taca to be censused by PSA.
48 See fn 84, Pélissier (1986), and various AHM and AHA reports; Vaz 1921, op. cit.; 
(1916) «Atentados CFL Ambaca» (AHM).
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and plantations, and sometimes to Angola also, where some labor 
contracts were more favorable, but there was also movement of far-
mers from the Angola to the Congo also.49 With the increasing com-
mercialization of the countrysides (see sections below), the nor-
thern border town of Tembo Aluma became a commercial center in 
the 1950s for people from both Angola and Congo, with Portuguese 
merchants also trading goods from Kinshasa (DENIS 1962). These 
sorts of linkages would be critical to facilitating the PSA political 
mobilization when area youth then living in Kinshasa were forcibly 
returned home in 1959. The independence of the Congo was wide-
ly publicized and experienced in Malanje (and in the front pages 
of Luanda newspapers), not least given the signiﬁ cant numbers of 
white settlers and traders that ﬂ ed into Angola, including some 500 
to Malanje.50 Tembo Aluma would be one of the earliest major areas 
of the Kassanje revolt, and Angolans in the area reportedly talked of 
«expelling the whites from their lands as was done to the whites in 
the Belgian Congo» (TEIXEIRA op. cit.). 
Having painted some of the broad conditions of connection be-
tween Malanje and Congo, we can understand other organizers of 
the Kassanje revolt (drawing on KAMABAYA [2007] and MARCUM 
[1969]) through connections also to Luanda and the transforma-
tions in the cotton sector and broader economy and landscape of 
Malanje and Kassanje. In mid-1960, activists from Malanje and 
Luanda increasingly moved their operations to spend more time 
in the Congo, particularly following a the colonial police sweep in 
Luanda arresting 50 key activists and killing dozens of protesting 
villagers in the cotton town Catete outside of Luanda and reputed 
birthplace of Angola’s ﬁ rst President Agostinho Neto.
A reportedly key organizer of the Kassanje revolt, António Ma-
riano, remains largely unknown, but he apparently made trips back 
and forth from Malanje to the Congo. He was born in the suburbs 
of Malanje, just across from the neighborhood that had been 
transformed by the growth of the cotton industry with massive new 
49 Vicente’s (1959) internal Cotonang report notes that the area around Tembo 
Aluma saw 270 farmers ﬂ ee in 1955, but then an increase of 455 farmers in 
1956-1959 (AHU).
50 See coverage in the Malanje newspaper Angola Norte: (1960) «Os aconteci-
mentos no Congo», July 16, p. 1; (1960) «Os refugiados do Congo Belga que 
passaram pela nossa Cidade», Aug 6; and see Mateus Ngola Katungo, in Freu-
denthal (2012: 19).
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Cotonang warehouses, processing facilities, and segregated white 
housing complexes. While Kamabaya (2007: 79) describes Mariano 
as a «Catholic catechist», there are also references to an António 
Diogo Mariano who worked for many years for the Protestant Me-
thodist church in the Baixa de Kassanje, ﬁ rst in the south at Kam-
bundi Katembo in the 1940s and then in the heart of the cotton 
lands at Kela in the 1950s.51 Either way, Mariano both saw the de-
plorable conditions and organized clandestinely with other church 
members, with peasants, and sympathetic traditional authorities, 
in addition to underground nationalist political activists in Malanje 
and the Congo, fusing syncretically Christian, African, and nationa-
list iconography in the form of holy water, incense, and incantations 
to Maria and Lumumba.52 Working as driver in the cotton zone for 
an important Holo soba named Kizamba (in an apparently mixed 
Suku and Holo area where a Pastor Morton had installed a mission 
in 1929), he also drove his Chevrolet up on through to Kinshasa 
several times, and reportedly brought back UPA literature and na-
tionalist ideas.53 
Another activist born in Malanje, João César Correia («Makwi-
za»), had studied in the mid-1940s at the American Methodist col-
lege at Keswa, studied in Benguela, and, after meeting clandestinely 
in Luanda with inspectors from the International Labor Organiza-
tion in 1959, also made the trek through the Baixa to the Congo in 
1960, meeting along the way with Mariano and sobas, and returning 
in 1961 as a military commander of the revolt (KAMABAYA 2007: 
51 There is also mention of an apparently different «António Mariano» joining 
the Methodist church around 1958 (Conferência Anual de Angola, p. 79). An-
tónio Diogo Mariano was admitted for Methodist exam in 1942, and became an 
effective member in 1944, having become a pastor around 1953, and was also 
reported as working in Kalandula (Duque de Bragança) in 1960. He served on 
the Nominations and Inter-dominational Commissions of the Methodist chur-
ch in 1959. See «Angola Conference General», 1959, United Methodist Church 
General Commission on Archives and History (GCAH) ﬁ le 1459-1-4:2, and «Mi-
nutes of the Annual Conferences of the Methodist Church», 1944, p. 124; 1938: 
28. See also Anuário do Ultramar Português, 1946: 117; 1951: 127; 1957: 130; 
1959: 135.
52 See also «Informação 216», February 27, p. 4 (AHU), which speciﬁ cally descri-
bes «calcinhas» at Kunda dya Baze actively organizing people, also mentioned 
in Freudenthal (1999: 275).
53 Lamal (1965: 60) reports that the Kizamba sector «between Kwango-Lukun-
ga» had 2,742 Baholo and 6.866 Basuku residents in 1959. See Marcum 
(1968:48), citing Neto (1966), a copy of which is yet to be located, but may be 
in the late Marcum’s papers still awaiting processing at Stanford.
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106-107). Another activist, João Bernardo Domingos («Kyoza»), 
a cousin of Rosário Neto, spent more time Luanda, helping found 
the short-lived Movement for the National Independence of Angola 
around 1957. In order to avoid arrest by the secret police, he ﬂ ed 
around 1960 to the Congo by passing through the clandestine po-
litical network of the Movement for National Liberation operating 
with the assistance of sympathetic Methodist priests in Keswa in 
Malanje. Shortly after the revolt Keswa would be called a center 
of subversion, having allegedly taught in geography lessons that 
«Angola is one of the independent African countries […]»54 Kyoza 
brought with him copies of a «Manifesto de Kasanji» for Rosário 
Neto. This Manifesto, authored by a ranged of nationalist ﬁ gures in 
Malanje and Luanda, analyzed conditions in the Baixa, denounced 
forced labor, and argued for the total and complete independence of 
Angola, as in the Congo.55 
4. Malanje-Luanda connections
Relations between Malanje and Luanda go back arguably half 
a millennia or more, so this section focuses just on a particularly 
important inter-linked set shaping the Kassanje revolt, speciﬁ cally 
contracted labor, transport, landholdings, and church networks.
A key driver of Malanje-Luanda connections was the expansiona-
ry dynamic, in which taxation in cash and kind both was an objecti-
ve to fund the state and a means for compelling labor for business, 
projects, services and a broader «civilizing mission». To help en-
force tax collection and administrative rule generally, by 1936 Ma-
lanje alone was apportioned 313 cipaios across some several dozen 
54 «Informação 696», March 29, 1961, p. 2 (AHU).
55 A range of other nationalist pamphlets, which made a point of emphasizing 
agrarian issues, had been printed, and circulated in Luanda, Malanje and 
elsewhere, particularly after activists with connections to Angolan sailors via 
the African Maritime Club in Lisbon were able to smuggle a lithograph machi-
ne aboard a ship to the southern Angolan port town of Lobito. Angolan and 
other nationalist organizers were able to use for their own purposes of political 
mobilization the changing transport and communications that were part of the 
exploitative agrarian and labor economy against which they protested. On the 
Clube Marítimo, see also Chase (2012: 102), Zau (2005), Rocha (1998), Line-
baugh and Rediker (2001), Brown (2009).
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administrative posts.56 Taxation was a key subject of a great deal of 
attentive and varied colonial thought, design and action (often in 
response to the difﬁ culties and contestation of implementing taxes) 
— by the early 1930s, there were already well over a 100 different 
legal measures issued on domestic taxation (not including issues of 
domestic and international trade tariffs and duties) (RAMOS 1970). 
Given the experience of 19th Century tax revolts in Angola, the new 
20th Century legislation explicitly addressed in its start in 1906 the 
need for «smooth and progressive» «gradual extension» of taxa-
tion in order to «avoid resistance».57 
State functionaries had a personal material incentive to boost tax 
collection, since they received percentages of the revenue as perso-
nal income bonuses, as well as a professional incentive, since the lo-
cal government received 20% of the total, a practice that continued 
until 1961. This principle of «co-participation» also included small 
but signiﬁ cant percentages of tax revenue paid to participating so-
bas.58 
Consequently, by 1919, tax was collected from 500,000 eligi-
ble people out of Angola’s total population of a couple million. By 
1920, the hut tax had been converted to an individual «head» tax 
(by 1923, applied to men only), and an «exact» census in 1926 co-
vered almost the entire country and population (and the remainder 
«inexactly»). Colonial state functionaries did quickly recognize that 
heavy taxes could prompt peasant resistance and avoidance, and 
hence taxes were varied and modiﬁ ed, harsh penalties levied, penal 
institutions established, numerous intermediaries of rule used, pass 
systems established, and roads constructed and villages resettled 
to enable monitoring and enforcement (where there was resistance 
to administrative orders, Angolan soldiers or staff could be shifted 
using the improved transport).
56 1934 legislation provided for 172 cipaios in Malanje (Diploma Legislativo 603). 
The number was reportedly raised subsequently, but the 1958 legislation sta-
ted Malanje has only 239. The number of cipaios in Malanje was raised in 
1937, 1941, 1950, 1951 and 1958 (see Portarias 1922, 2223, 3711, 7266, 7613 
and 10275 respectively). See also Ordem Geral n8, Ordem de Malange n1, Ja-
nuary 20, 1936.
57 See e.g. Decreto of September 13, 1906.
58 Ibid., Portaria 375 of 1913, Portaria 11066 of 1959, Decreto 22793 of 1933, De-
creto 23417 of 1934, and Portaria 2482 of 1937.
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What is also crucial to remember is that in addition to such ex-
plicit formal taxation, there was also a very signiﬁ cant effective ta-
xation in kind through forced labor, which is harder to quantify but 
hugely important to peoples’ daily lives, grievances, and colonial 
rule. Some of the extent of unrecorded local forced labor for trans-
port infrastructure construction is discussed below in section 4.2 
below.
Figure 8. Indigenous taxation in Malanje: Numbers (lft, columns) 
and value (rt, shaded)
 
Source: Banco de Angola (1954-1960), GPM (1935), Dip. Leg. 242/1931
4.1. Contracted labor
Contracted labor was a key aspect of the Malanje economy, and 
connected people from diverse areas of the province, rural and 
urban, and connected people from Malanje with other places and 
peoples. Surprisingly, the extensive social relations of widespread 
contracting of labor throughout Angola have received little detailed 
scholarly analysis.59 


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shaded) 
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59 Although the great historical importance of Angolan laborers has been widely 
recognized, and numerous studies discuss or mention slavery, forced labor, 
and contracted labor (VOS 2014), nonetheless few studies have actually looked
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 systematically at detailed empirical evidence of labor contracting to unders-
tand the patterns of this labor, which is crucial in understanding the structure 
of the economy and the formation of socio-spatial relations throughout Ango-
la. For example, the very interesting social history studies on contract labor to 
particular sugar and diamond complexes by Ball (2003) and Cleaveland (2008) 
provide many insights based on archival and interview data, but neither situa-
tes these in relation to the broader trends of contracted labor. Messiant (1983) 
describes totals and different types of labor, but what of regional patterns?
60 One could compare the number of contractees given the population in the res-
pective areas (particularly the population of working-age men), but it is also 
not clear that workers were in their villages of origin when the census was con-
ducted. The census did include some numbers migrants living in other areas.
61 It is not clear to what extent contract labor from Diamang in Lunda is also
Recruitment from the central highlands going to the northern 
coffee lands was the most important pattern of labor contracting, 
and that which is often mentioned. However, no in-depth study 
of that regime has been conducted, as far as I know. Moreover, no 
study has examined the signiﬁ cance of the patterns of the massive 
amount of other labor contracting. In 1958, for example, about two-
thirds of the total contract labor in Angola was from areas outside 
the southern highlands of Huambo, Benguela, and Bie that fed the 
coffee plantations in the north.60 Earlier statistics show from 1948 
show Malanje supplying a quarter of the total contractees
 
Figure 9. Road construction, contracted labor, and urban 
construction, 1911-1960
 
Sources: Anuário Estatístico; Diniz (1917, 1929); Mouta (1934)61 
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A small sample of records from 1952 quickly reveals that Malanje 
laborers came from a range of places throughout the province, and 
went to hundreds of different locations throughout Malanje, with 
hundreds of people also sent to areas further aﬁ eld such as the 
coffee hills of Dembos, the Tentativa sugar plantation at Caxito, the 
outskirts of Luanda at Kifangondo, and so on. Contract labor, in 
short, was hardly restricted to use on only a few resource-intensive 
«enclaves», and instead connected a range of people, ideas and 
experiences — networks out of which the revolt would emerge.
The pool of possible contract labor in Malanje was reduced by 
Cotonang’s monopsony since 1930 on recruiting labor in the cotton 
areas, stirring controversy, or at least that was the sentiment felt 
in internal Cotonang reports.62 There was competition over labor, 
colored though with variations of elitist and/or white nationalist 
business’ critiques of foreign businesses. Exposés and reports at the 
time mention the extensive use of contracted labor, and there was 
an elaboration of various administrative bureaucracies for mana-
ging this labor. The state Agência da Curadoria monitored labor. Li-
censes were given to labor contractors. Wages and conditions were 
regulated. Identity cards for taxation and control of movement were 
designed, distributed, monitored and enforced. But the administra-
tion of these contracts also appears to have been rife with patrona-
ge, as fees were paid by contractors to government ofﬁ cials regula-
ting contracting (See FERREIRA 1948: 4-5). So, it was not simply 
the harsh economic exactions that were felt and resentment, but 
 included in the category «Malanje» also, since the contract monitoring agency 
may have grouped them together administratively. The difference in the to-
tals between years 1956 and 1957 is related to the classiﬁ cation and counting 
of contract laborers. Whereas in 1956 the classiﬁ cation distinguished between 
those contracted with and without intervention (of the state?), with ¾ of total 
involving intervention, for 1957 the classiﬁ cation was changed to distinguish 
between those with and without contract (and for those with contracts, whe-
ther for public or private purposes), and the new category of estimated 
non-contracted laborers was large.
62 The monopsony on recruiting labor in Kassanje was established with the Cotton 
Intendency, by Diploma Legislativo 242 on 13 January1930. It was reiterated in 
subsequent legislation, e.g. the 1946 Decreto 35844 Art. 54, which prohibited 
recruiting labor for work outside the cotton zone. On the contentiousness of 
this monopoly amidst labor shortage, see Ferreira (1948) and Banco de Angola 
(1956), «Relatório Anual da Agência do Banco de Angola em Malange: Exercí-
cio de 1956», Banco Nacional de Angola Archives, Malanje.
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also the loss of freedom of movement and autonomy, as well as 
the arbitrary depredations by the expanding bureaucracy. Some re-
volters put their passbooks, annual tax forms, and other cards on 
spikes (Informação 262, op. cit., p. 5). People did nonetheless try 
to use such forced labor movement to their own ends of sharing 
information and political conscientization.63 Repeated encounters 
with other laborers and residents from across Malanje and Angola 
helped forge a sense of a broader collective identity and struggle.
4.2. Transport: Road and rail construction and use
Laboring on transport infrastructure in particular was both a 
grievance as well as a means for political mobilization and revolt. 
Grievances about work were directly about the exactions, but also 
indirectly about how such infrastructure fostered further expropria-
tions, injustices and risks associated with intensifying commerciali-
zation and extension of the state. Such grievances were also highly 
gendered, since women were disproportionately utilized, and yet 
saw men and the state attempt to restrict their movement, morals 
and money. However, the emerging transport system was also used 
by people to make social and political connections key to the revolt, 
and would also be sabotaged to try to prevent military repression.
Much of the early forced and contract labor went to constructing 
the Luanda-Malanje railway in the early 1900s, which was revam-
ped in the 1930s, as well as a huge system of roads in the 1910s and 
1920s, which were also repaired and maintained through ongoing 
manual labor in the 1930s to the 1950s (ALVES 1935; ROSS 1925; DE 
MATOS 1944; CGC 1939; SANTOS 1927; JOHNSON 1929: 207). This in-
vestment of labor in turn allowed Portuguese administrative occu-
pation and movement, and enabled the censusing, taxing, and mo-
bilization of even more labor for other construction projects and for 
agricultural production. The rail, for example, was key to bringing 
heavy supplies and rations from Luanda for military expeditions to 
occupy Malanje and the diamond-rich Lunda Province in the North 
East from the 1900s through the 1920s (MACHADO 1913; PÉLISSIER 
63 See Freudenthal (2012); compare also Vos (2015: 115), and the work of Shana 
Melnysyn on the Bailundo Revolt.
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1986). Again, when the revolt broke out in Malanje in 1961, the rail-
road was used to quickly bring army units to Malanje.
Since the start of de Matos’ reign, a staggering 25,000 kilometers 
were reportedly constructed from 1912-1923. By 1927, Malanje Pro-
vince itself was reported to have 2,200 km of motorable roads, and 
by 1935 also a «considerable extension» of paths, some 118 bridges, 
and 10 pontoons (FERREIRA 1927: 29-30; ALVES 1935: 19 & Appen-
dices).64 Various road boards and brigades continued work through 
the 1930s and 1940s, increasing after World War II by the public 
investment of the colonial development promotion plans.
Equally if not more important than the main formal railroad and 
highways was the extensive quotidian forced labor supervised by 
local colonial administrators in the construction and maintenance 
of 18,000 km of dirt roads and 29,000 km of paths. Forced labor 
for road construction was legally enshrined in a series of general 
administrative laws throughout the ﬁ rst decades of the Twentieth 
Century. Although absent from national statistics, local labor was 
used by local administrators for local roads whose construction and 
maintenance such functionaries were responsible as part of their 
overall administrative duties.65 The burden of forced local road 
work increasingly fell disproportionately on women who remained 
in their villages, since men were away as migrant labor to pay their 
taxes, from which women were exempt after 1923.66 By 1973, Ma-
lanje was reported to have 4217 km of picadas, in addition to the 
2200 km of state paved roads and 249 km district roads (CASTRO 
1974).67 
Because the huge contributions of such forced labor were not 
quantiﬁ ed with a monetary value and thereby included in ofﬁ cial co-
lonial ﬁ nancial statistics, this effectively gigantic «payment» of taxes 
64 See also the 1918 map of roads and planned road construction, which sho-
ws the roads connecting the capitals of the districts and the frontiers: «Rede 
estradas da província de Angola: construídas, em construção e projectadas», 
1:2,000,000, Luanda, 46x70 cm (Biblioteca Central da Marinha, Lisbon, 2-11-
13/547).
65 See Portaria 375 Art. 26 §5 and §22, Art. 58§3, and Art 78, and the 1933 Over-
seas Administrative Reform Law Art. 53 §4 and Art.70 §3.
66 See Decreto 235, February 2, 1923.
67 Such work also entailed possibly thousands of manual rock breaking sites; by 
1958 there were a dozen registered rock breaking facilities in Malanje (Anu-
ário Estatístico). The rise of roads can also only be understood in terms of 
managed competition with and substitution for rail transport.
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through labor has been grossly ignored by analysts emphasizing the 
«gatekeeping» aspects of states in Africa and the limited adminis-
trative reach. Indeed, the actual extent — quantiﬁ ed or not — of 
forced labor was often deliberately hidden or obfuscated because 
of the ongoing international publicity, heated debate, and scandals 
surround the heinous and often illegal and/or informal abuses and 
conditions (See COOPER 1996 and HIGGS 2012). Simply because 
such forced labor was not given a ﬁ nancial value by colonial ad-
ministrations in their accounting books does not mean that such 
forced labor did not occur. Indeed it is impossible to understand 
the subsequent shift to mechanization and the contemporary em-
phasis on mechanization in construction and agriculture in Angola 
without really documenting and appreciating the extensive painful 
histories of such pervasive but unquantiﬁ ed forced labor.
The decades of labor abuses incurred in building and maintai-
ning the roads generated widespread resentment. Some such abu-
ses in Malanje were documented in a published report transmitted 
in June 1925 to the League of Nations’ Slavery Commission about 
the continuing labor abuses in Portuguese Africa, in turn contribu-
ting to the League’s passage in September 1926 of the Slavery Con-
vention. The Report and Convention came after international ou-
trage several decades earlier about forced labor from Angola being 
used on cocoa plantations in São Tomé — and which in turn spurred 
some minor changes as well as Angola’s new labor code a few years 
later. Likewise, the Norwegian anthropologist Amandous Johnson 
had also traveled to Malanje around the same time, and documen-
ted similarly outrageous abuses of women laborers constructing ro-
ads leading east from Malanje city towards the Baixa:
«Early one morning I was awakened by mumbling sounds that 
seemed to come from a thousand voices […] On the large open space 
in front of the station stood about 300 women in the damp cold with 
only a loin cloth, stiff with dirt on it. All had baskets on their heads 
and many a child on her back. Afterwards I found out that they had 
been ordered out to repair the roads. Approximately twenty of them 
stood separate from the others. After a few minutes a Negro soldier 
swung a whip. After having commanded the one who was lucky to 
hold out their hand, he gave out six or eight lashes on their palm. The 
women took against the beating without making a sound, shook from 
punishment on the hands, held them under their hipdress and stepped 
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to the side, as if it were an everyday event occurring. But the kids, 
who did not understand it all, screamed mercilessly. The poor victi-
ms had probably sought to deceive the government on a few hours of 
work by staying at home or hiding in the woods, or maybe they were 
ill and unable to work» (JOHNSON 1929: 207).
An end result of such stark and widely resented and remembe-
red abuses however was greater ﬁ xed capital in the form of roads 
that facilitated circulation of forced labor to plantations and other 
works. Transport facilitated such contracted labor, and hence also 
a growing commercial economy, which entailed the signiﬁ cant mo-
vement within Malanje and to other provinces, as illustrated by the 
trafﬁ c ﬁ gures for the smaller train stations in the year 1960. From 
small towns that were not even municipal capitals, thousands of 
people rode the train.68 
Passenger trafﬁ c on trains was gradually facing competition by 
growing networks of bus services. The state allocated particular pri-
vate companies with speciﬁ c routes.69 In 1957, for example, there 
were 45 of these regular bus and trucking routes throughout nearly 
10,000 km of the country. By the late 1950s transport from Luan-
da eastward through Malanje picked up, particularly for the heavy 
machinery needed to power, process and support the increasingly 
mechanized diamond extraction that was spreading west from the 
dwindling initial alluvial ﬁ nds towards the Kwango River on Baixa’s 
eastern edge, where hundreds of diamond workers would join the 
revolt.70 
Beyond the railroad terminus, the road network in the Baixa 
de Kassanje was improved partly through ﬁ nancing from cotton 
sales. Under a 1936 law, 2.5% of the total amount that Cotonang 
paid in purchasing cotton from farmers was allocated to a special 
government fund for purposes of road building and conservation. 
So, while this could be interpreted as colonial delegation to a private 
68 3,703 at Cambunze, 8,647 at Cacuso, 1,870 at Matete, 1,451 at Aldeia Formosa, 
399 at Cacolo, 1,943 at Lombe, 1,542 at KM 417, 15,211 at Malange, for a total 
of 34,766 (BA 1962).
69 The routes were outlined in the Anuário Estatístico.
70 See «Informação n.º 145/61-G.U.» 06/02/61, AHM; Anuário Estatístico 1957, 
p. 215; Cleaveland (2008); (1953) «Pontes na Província de Malange», Angola 
Norte, Dec 19, p. 1; (1956) «A Companhia de Diamantes de Angola», Angola 
Norte, Sept 8, p. 1. 
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concessionaire of state functions of tax collection, in reality that was 
only a relatively small task, as the funds were still managed and 
spent by state authorities, who had to ﬁ nd and mobilize labor for 
the road works. The situation was one of increasing state-private 
collaboration, rather than any one-off delegation. The result, after 
ten years, was an extensive network of 865 km of roads in the cotton 
zones, which more than doubled in the next ten years to 1711 kms.71 
By 1961 Kassanje peasants would protest these state exactions of 
labor for road works — not just cotton prices — and aim to turn the 
road network to their advantage militarily by setting up roadblocks 
and ambushes, destroying bridges, and refusing to obey state ofﬁ -
cials’ orders (see also CANN 2015: 55). 
4.3. Rural and urban land and the settler economy
Increasing economic, social and political discontent in colonial 
Malanje was shaped by the great extent of land claims, land inequa-
lity, and general «rural reordering» in Malanje and Angola before 
and after 1961, though these have been signiﬁ cantly underestima-
ted by most analysts. These dynamics went well beyond the usually 
mentioned purported enclaves of cash and export crops, and the 
«strategic hamlets» in war zones.
In an important decades-long process beginning in the early 
Twentieth Century and variously called «villagization», «concen-
tration», «regrouping», and «rural reordering» — which deplora-
bly has yet to be studied thoroughly — thousands of rural villages 
throughout Angola were ordered by colonial administrators to be 
concentrated from dispersed locations near water sources and mo-
ved into dense linear settlements along ever more ﬂ at and straight 
roads.72 The legal foundations for this were laid as early as 1911 in 
laws specifying reduced hut taxes for people living closer to muni-
cipal capitals, regional roads, and military posts, soon followed by 
orders for local administrators to force Angolans to live in «concen-
trated» settlements of no less than 10 structures, or face stiff ﬁ nes. 
71  See Diploma Legislativo 859, BO 47 of 1936 (this also modiﬁ ed Diploma Legis-
lativo 242 of 1930, which used 5%). See GDM (1954: 33).
72 For further details and references on this section, see DeGrassi (2015).
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Chiefs were also given a ﬁ nancial incentive to concentrate villages 
since their stipends were based on village size.73 
The great signiﬁ cance of these phenomena is that they connect 
the processes throughout Angola with what was happening in Kas-
sanje (cotton concentrations), thereby reframing the Kassanje re-
volt away from an example of state neglect and delegation and ins-
tead as an example of the sort of state intervention that was in fact 
more pervasive throughout Angola than is commonly recognized.
Village concentration in practice facilitated clearing land for set-
tler plantation claims in a more extensive area than the export crop 
zones that are usually emphasized (cotton, coffee, and sugar). First-
hand research in Malanje’s colonial land archives showed that ofﬁ -
cial land statistics about provisional and deﬁ nitive concessions fai-
led signiﬁ cantly to accurately show the actually much greater extent 
in practice of land claims and inequality. The land inequality in the 
agrarian economy combined with not only contract labor and va-
rious infrastructures, but also the economic, social and political dy-
namics of urban restructuring and trade. The nationalist networks 
and organizing that went on spanning Malanje, Congo and Luanda 
were informed and motivated by this broader pattern of growing 
segregation and inequality in the booming settler economy. The 
numbers of white Portuguese in Malanje city jumped, and white 
traders increasingly set up shop in smaller municipal capitals and 
towns. Much of the massive post-World War II urban restructuring 
of Luanda was driven by the booming coffee plantation economy, 
until the coffee price crises of the mid-late 1950s (PAIGE 1975), as 
demonstrated spatially by the landmark studies by Angolan-Portu-
guese geographer Ilídio de Amaral (1960, 1968).
The settler coffee boom-driven urban restructuring must have 
been apparent to the many subsequent elite in government and politics, 
such as Agostinho Neto, who attended the Liceu Salvador Correia in the 
quickly changing Ingombotas neighborhood (CORREIA 2009). In-
gombotas was established much earlier from dislocations, and low-
level informal housing remained after the train tracks were removed 
from its modest incline and shifted up the coast. By the coffee boom 
73 1911 Regulamento, Art.110; see also Portarias 377 and 378 of 1912, Decreto 
1224 of 1914; Portaria 137 of December 1921, as well as a piece of legislation in 
Boletim Oﬁ cial n.º 12 of 1913.
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however, African residents in Ingombotas were being displaced by 
apartments for white settlers (AMARAL 1960, 1968).
Socio-spatial connections and political consciousness were also 
stoked by processes of urban restructuring underway in provincial 
capitals and smaller towns throughout Angola. A series of colonial 
city planning and urbanization plans and projects were undertaken. 
These built on, exacerbated, and entrenched the still visible segre-
gated spatial structures in dozens of municipal capitals and small 
towns across the Malanje countryside. This quotidian segregation 
has received much less scholarly attention than Luanda, but was 
perhaps more pervasive. 
During his year in Malanje in 1945, for example, Agostinho Neto, 
as he walked up the city’s main road, passed by visible buildings 
embodying this new order.74 He passed the bustling trading sto-
res, the car and agriculture suppliers, the end of the train line, with 
its hulking Cotonang warehouses, and, as he reaching his work at 
the medical ofﬁ ce, he would have seen the construction work on 
Cotonang’s new segregated residential neighborhood nearby.75 It 
was in the burgeoning forced-labor cotton-plantation hub city of 
Malanje that he is reported to have experienced life-altering racial 
discrimination when he was refused entrance by a low-tier hotel for 
whites only. Ten years later, Amílcar Cabral, too, after meeting with 
Neto in Lisbon, would walk these streets past Cotonang on his way 
up to do research tests at silos quickly ﬁ lling with plantation set-
tlers’ maize crop from that season’s ﬁ rst harvest. From Cabral’s im-
pressions and the statistics from his agronomic research in Malanje 
and elsewhere in Angola, he would several years later in 1960 pen 
his polemic The facts about Portugal’s African Colonies, decrying 
humiliating segregation, land expropriation, and forced labor in 
cotton and coffee in Angola, noting how some of such agricultural 
wealth ended up in ownership of «blocks of flats in Lisbon» 
(CABRAL and FONSECA 1956; VICENTE 2011: 55; IICT and INEP 1988; 
CABRAL 1980).76  
74 See also the colonial urban development plans for Duque de Bragança (Kalan-
dula) and Malanje.
75 See (1948) Angola Norte, May 29; (1958) Angola Norte, Dec 6.
76  The presence of agrarian capital in urban buildings can also be gleaned for Malan-
je by some of the conﬁ scations in Diário da República Despacho Conjunto 47-Y 
of August 28, 1992, such as those of A. Santos Pinto, SIPP, Vitorino Sampaio Ma-
galhães, Evaristo Machado, Leonel Gomes Pinto, Fazenda de Santa Isabel, etc.
A
h
ar
on
 d
e 
G
ra
ss
i
94
In addition to being invested in real estate and construction, the 
proﬁ ts from the expanding contract-labor based plantation eco-
nomy also often circulated through usurious trading stores that sold 
imported goods on credit at high interest rates to farmers (SANTOS 
2005). From 1954 to 1958 the number of registered trading stores 
in Malanje Province increased by a quarter from 362 to 448 (BANCO 
DE ANGOLA 1958). 
4.4. Church networks
Catholic and Protestant Church networks linking Malanje and 
Luanda, and perhaps Congo, and numerous small towns were also 
key in the facilitating the revolt, through both education and con-
necting people from disparate areas.77 The Catholic churches in Ma-
lanje expanded from the city in 1890 to the Baixa in 1900 (Luremo/
Mussuco) and 1913 (Bangalas), with another two in the mid-1930s, 
and four more by 1960, some with close relations with Cotonang 
(See POLANAH 1970; FERREIRA 1942). These often involved schools, 
and a range of indigenous catechists — by 1959, across 13 parishes 
in Malanje there was a total of nearly 250 staff (Anuário Estatísti-
co). In the Methodist church also, there were a range of different 
commissions, activities, and forums, involving the direct engage-
ment of thousands of people across the Baixa. Rotating positions 
through the church exposed catechists to diverse and challenging 
circumstances and communities, and helped forge connections, 
foster debates and circulate ideas.
One particularly important ﬁ gure was the Reverend Job Baltazar 
Diogo, who studied at the old American Methodist college in Keswa 
established in 1887, but also served in the historic rocky town of Pun-
go Andongo amidst proliferating European plantations.78 During the 
77  In the 1950s, the Methodist church in Malanje also had a presence in the sou-
thern Congo, including Kapanga, (with a hospital), Sandoa, the growing mi-
ning site of Kolwezi, Mulungwishi, Jadotville, and Kinshasa.
78 See Kamabaya (2007), and also «Minutes of the Annual Conferences of the 
Methodist Episcopal Church», 1934, p. 415; Anuário do Império Colonial Por-
tuguês, 1946, p. 117.
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Figure 10. Reverend Job Baltazar Diogo in Keswa translating the 
bible into Kimbundu in 1960, before his arrest in 1961
 
Source: GCAH File 2190-3-3:2
coffee boom years, he served in the rebellious Dembos coffee dis-
trict, which saw massive land alienation for European plantations.79 
Upon his return to Keswa, he worked on translating the bible into 
Kimbundu (working on II Kings, Ecclesiasticies, Genesis, and Exo-
dus in 1959-1960), served on a range of church commissions (you-
th, music, memory, and ritual), and coordinated a clandestine cell 
of the National Liberation Movement at Keswa, as well as joining 
the UPA. Reverend Diogo’s son, Bornito de Sousa, is now Minister 
of Territorial Administration, and presided over commemorations 
of the Kassanje revolt, together with Boaventura Cardoso. Cardoso 
was then governor of Malanje, and a former Minister of Culture, 
and was the son of the popular nurse, dentist and underground po-
litical activist Sebastião Cardoso, who was also active in Malanje at 
the time of the Kassanje revolt. Other major nationalist ﬁ gures that 
were active in the church included Cónego Manuel Joaquim Men-
des das Neves, who was born in the coffee areas west of Malanje, 
79  Agostinho Neto, the MPLA leader and Angola’s ﬁ rst president, also spent time in 
Piri in the plantation coffee lands of Dembos, and notably, its massive 48,000 
ha concession of Jose and Eduardo Anapaz (Anapaz & Irmão) in Piri, which 
was also the birth place of Nito Alves, an MPLA ﬁ gure and leader of a repressed 
«protest»/«coup» in 1977 (VICENTE 2011; GGA 1944).
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and was in contact with Diogo and a wide range of other nationalist 
and church ﬁ gures, including Father Joaquim Pinto de Andrade. It 
was under Father Pinto de Andrade that Rosário Neto had studied 
at the Seminary in Luanda (KAMABAYA 2003, 2007).80 
So, rather than view nationalist politics as restricted to a cosmo-
politan coastal creole elite, with separate parochial peasant protests 
in exploited interior enclaves, the political mobilization in the larger 
Malanje region was part of a larger extensive history and geogra-
phy of explicitly nationalist protest that connected issues of land 
and labor exploitation to demands on the colonial government and 
the international community for equal rights and independence. 
As illustrated above in relation to the Congo connections, people 
protested both in relation to experiences in the past and familia-
rity with other places, as well as their immediate concerns. Rosá-
rio Neto, for example, drew on the experiences of his grandfather 
Joaquim «Kanguya» Filipe Cardoso, who was jailed for trying to 
petition the League of Nations in 1927 for Angolan independence 
(as described for Jamaica by Marcus Garvey). Kanguya wrote as 
part of a broader «Nativist Movement» throughout parts of nor-
thern Angola since 1917 at least, which included various attacks and 
threatened bombings of the railway, with August 15th appointed as 
Angola’s Independence Day.81 Earlier, in the 1910s and 1920s, the 
famed writer António de Assis Júnior penned a diatribe against land 
expropriation in the coffee areas, and others such as Quimamuenho 
(Kimamwenyu) worked tirelessly defending peasants against du-
bious settler expropriation of their land (FERREIRA 1989; CORRADO 
2008; ASSIS JÚNIOR 1917). And in the 1920s and 1930s, there were 
related syncretic Garveyist, Kimbanguist, Kasonzola and Jehova’s 
Witness Watchtower/Kitawala activities ideas circulating around 
the region (Marcum 1969).82 Likewise, Marcum (1969: 47) notes «a 
80 See also the seminarians between Keswa and Cacuso later arrested, in «Infor-
mação 691», April 1, 1961 (AHU).
81 See Marcum (1969: 47), who says Cardoso was also known as «Canguia». 
Marcum reports that Kanguya’s son (Rosário’s father or uncle) also organized 
«Baha» protests and secret cells in the 1950s. See «Nota ao Quartel-General 
ao comandante militar do Dondo de 6-Abril-1918 transcrevendo uma carta 
que dá conta da situação actual do cabecilha da revolta João Caiangue» (AHM 
2/2/51/12), and «Auto de declarações de Manuel Velasco de Beça Teixeira 
prestadas em Pungo Andongo sobre o Movimento Nativista», 1917 (AHM). 
82  On Black Moses in Quela (Kela) in 1924, see Santos, cited by Pélissier (1978).
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movement known as Moïse Noir [Black Moses] spread through the 
countryside. According to its message, American Negroes would 
come to liberate the African from European oppression». Six years 
prior to the 1961 revolt, there were reports around Tembo Aluma, 
Milando and Ginga posts of renewed religious «Kasonzola» agita-
tion similar to that underpinning the revolt, with killing of white 
livestock in expectation of a savior «who would descend the Cuan-
go and bring arms, gunpowder and money so that the indigenous 
would have means to wage war to liberate themselves from whi-
tes».83 And again, in June 1960, the time of Congo’s Independence, 
there were still further reports of Kasonzola in Malanje.84 
The Portuguese colonial regime responded to such unrest with a 
mix of increasing administrative surveillance and policing, particu-
larly through increasing the numbers of the several hundred cipaios 
then spread across the administrative posts of Malanje.85 However, 
there were also token efforts at providing social measures in some of 
the key and contentious areas, either directly or through church or cha-
ritable organizations, in the form of a commission on cotton prices, 
corporate and labor laws (weak and often unenforced) and social 
development schemes and projects (such as, water, education/
training, health, housing, etc) (e.g. CUNHA 1953; CRCCAU 1961).86 So, 
rather than view the Kassanje revolt as spastic reaction against dro-
pping prices in a purported delegation by the state to a privately 
run enclave, instead the revolt grew out of broader and longer-term 
expansion of contested negotiations between different social groups 
and state and corporate agents.
In sum, there were multiple, overlapping networks of people 
connecting the regions of Malanje and Luanda through different 
sorts of relations — through churches, contract labor, commerce, 
migration, and activism. The links were not simply arcs between 
83  See Martins, M. (1961) «Apontamento 14: Os Incidentes da Baixa de Cassan-
ge», January 30, p. 14, AHU. On Kasonzola more generally, see Pélissier (1978). 
84  Arcaute and Asúa (1961: 49) mention reports around northern Malanje of a 
«Casonsola Mission».
85  See fn 55, and AHM reports: da Silva, Major José Inácio (1915) «Inspecção 9.ª 
Companhia Indígena de Infantaria – Malanje»; Vieira, A. (1939) «6.ª Compa-
nhia Indígena de Caçadores»; Rodrigues, J. (1937) «Instrução de Recrutas do 
Contingente de 6.ª Companhia», and similar through to the 1950s.
86  See Neto, J. (1960) «Algumas considerações acerca da Zona Algodoeira da 
Baixa do Cassange», Delegação de Quela, JEA, November 29. The cotton price 
commission was ordered in September 1, 1960, in Oﬁ cio 15/60.
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the two main cities, but involved dozens of small towns, villages, 
plantations, mines, projects, factories, homes, churches, stores, and 
other sites. These places carried their own sedimented histories of 
connections, transformations and protests, and it is through these 
layers of relations that the 1961 revolt emerged. What was also key, 
however, was not simply Malanje’s role as a crossroads, with con-
nections to Luanda and Congo, but major socio-spatial transforma-
tions in Malanje and the Baixa de Kassanje region itself, some of 
which have already been mentioned.
5. Transformations in Malanje and Kassanje
In addition to the important roles of connections through to the 
Congo and Luanda, the precise timing of the revolt should also be 
understood in relation to the particular conjuncture of circumstan-
ces in Malanje. The prior year had seen heavy rains destroy crops, 
the head tax rate rose 15% in 1959, and costs of living and particu-
larly food prices had risen in Malanje Province since 1957.87 The 
late 1950s saw declining numbers of people growing cotton due to 
mounting difﬁ culties with intensive cotton production, including 
increased pest and weed problems, concentration of farms distant 
from peoples’ villages, and heavy investments in lowland draina-
ge and soil conservation and erosion works.88 State and Cotonang 
reports had complained for years about the lack of labor due to na-
tives’ primitive and lazy nature, and also problems of inadequate 
food production in the area. In response, and contradicting notions 
87   On the impact of the rains on production, see ﬁ gures in Figure 1. Price indexes 
are in the Banco de Angola reports for Malanje, it is not yet clear what the cau-
se of the increase was. On poor rain, see Cotonang (1961) Relatório e Contas 
1960, Cotonang, and Angola Norte 6 June 1960 and 24 December 1960. See 
Banco de Angola on the tax.
88  In particular, the weed imperata cylindrica, known locally as senu or seno, 
and pests such as lygus, diparopsis, heliothis, jassids, and dysdercus (NUNES 
1960; DIAS DOS SANTOS 1960: 8; COTONANG 1960a, 1960b; GEORGES 1960; 
GOUVEIA; SALAZAR 1968: vol. 1, pp. 30-31, 2; vol. 2 p. 10; MACDONALD 2004). 
A pest Disinfestation Program approved by the Governor General planned to 
treat 7,000 ha in 1961, increasing to 31,000 ha by 1963 (Administrador Dele-
gado, Cotonang Relatório 1960 «Esboço de um programa de desinsectisação 
da cultura algodoeira na Baixa de Cassange» July 12, Lisbon, 16pp.).
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of a private enclave, in these projects, state ofﬁ cials from the Cot-
ton Export Board (Junta de Exportação de Algodão) worked closely 
with Cotonang employees (there were roughly 400 Cotonang agents 
by the late 1950s) to concentrate tens of thousands of farmers in 
lowland areas where they could be monitored and forced to work 
the heavy dark soils that were fertile but also susceptible to ﬂ oo-
ding. Moreover, local state administrators received bonuses based 
on cotton production levels and not only helped enforce these me-
asures but also illegally prevented many Angolans from leaving to 
seek work elsewhere (COTONANG 1960b; DIAS DOS SANTOS 1961: 13; 
JEA 1960: 4).89 Under a 1949 law, everyone in the cotton zone was 
required to show proof of cultivation through a special green-colo-
red cotton passbook («caderneta»), which showed how much they 
had produced and sold, where, when, and with how much seed.90 
In a stinging report written shortly after the revolt, the Director in 
Angola of the state Cotton Export Board could not have been clearer 
in blaming local state agents rather than just Cotonang employees: 
«the cause that contributes most to the poor condition of people in 
the cotton zones» was «too intense intervention by the administra-
tive authorities» (DIAS DOS SANTOS 1961:4). The scholars mentioned 
above got it wrong in emphasizing delegation to a private company 
enclave and economic protest against only poor prices — state inter-
vention in the cotton concession areas was prevalent, intensive, and 
insidious, illustrated powerfully by the issue of ﬁ eld and settlement 
concentration.
Colonial administrators were rhetorically attentive to potential 
conﬂ icts between the forced cotton production calendar and food 
crop production, but in practice there were several issues and times 
when there was conﬂ ict. The work rhythm was spelled out in detail.
89  1960, Cotonang, and Angola Norte 6 June 1960 and 24 December 1960. See 
Banco de Angola on the tax.
90  See Portaria 6919 of 1949.
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Figure 11. Cotton production and marketing calendar
Date  Activity   Days
Early December Seed Distribution  1
Mid December Preparation of Land  15
Start of January Sowing    6
Mid-January Re-sowing   3
Late January First weeding   8
Late February Second weeding   8
Late March  Third weeding   8
Early June  Construction of drying racks 3
Mid June  First Harvest   11
Early July  First Market Sales  6
Late July  Second Harvest   11
Late August  Second market sales  4
Early September Third harvest   4
Early October Third market sales  1
Mid October  Pulling up and burning  2
   TOTAL:   89
Source: Dias dos Santos (1960: 8)91 
There are two rainy seasons for growing crops, one from roughly 
late September to December and one from late January to April. 
Cotton was cultivated from December to May. The difﬁ cult male la-
bor of preparing ﬁ elds in December falls precisely at the end of the 
major hungry season, in which the stored food reserves have been 
exhausted, but the crops planted in September and October have 
yet to yield. In that context, farmers are required to perform heavy 
labor, and also to spend a significant proportion of the money 
earned in cotton sales in July and August on taxes.92 Another poten-
tial conﬂ ict had to do with the strict state-appointed time for sowing 
in January and February, which could detract from time for food 
harvesting.93 At the end of the cotton season, some cotton weeding 
and harvesting would be done in the lean season long after important 
91    See also João Vunje in Freudenthal (2012: 18), and fn 103.
92   Legislation set tax collection for the start of January (see, e.g., Portaria 3817 of 
October 22, 1941, though other early or later legislation may also state this).
93   See (1958) «Cultura do algodão no distrito de Malange», Angola Norte, March 
5.
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short-cycle food from the ﬁ rst growing season had been harvested 
(such as maize, peanuts, beans, tomatoes, squash, cabbage, and 
sweet potatoes, but not yam and cassava). Closely related to tempo-
ral conﬂ icts between food and cotton production were spatial issues 
of designated cotton plots, distances from villages to such plots, and 
relocation of villages to concentrated cotton plots.
As mentioned in section 4.3 above, the concentration of cotton 
plots in the Baixa de Kassanje should be seen not as exceptional but 
rather as a clear manifestation of a processes that were occurring 
throughout much of Angola, namely state-directed village concen-
tration, in conjunction with taxation, road construction and admi-
nistrative control.
By 1960, most of the people growing cotton for Cotonang in the 
Baixa, some 31,000 people, were farming at 400 «concentrations» 
in 21 different «sectors» of the Baixa, with each sector’s lands par-
celed into reserves based on presumed optimal aptitude for growing 
cotton.94 Concentration was said to facilitate technical productivity, 
and control over production, workers, and sales, all deemed neces-
sary to address the accumulating problems of the preceding inten-
sive years 1933-1943, namely increasing pests, soil fertility, disea-
se, low production, and ﬂ eeing labor (NEVES 1954: 12-15).95 As the 
commercial cotton agro-industrial economy boomed across the re-
gion, such changes in production and settlement occurred together 
with changing movements of people, goods, money and ideas.
Concentration in the Baixa in particular had been pursued as pro-
duction increased and the colonial state’s Cotton Export Board was 
created in 1938. A 1946 law tasked the Cotton Export Board with pro-
moting concentration, which together with crop-rotation was promo-
ted as a solution to scarcity and ﬂ eeing of labor, as well as lack of food 
crops. The state Cotton Export Board would delimit which areas wi-
thin the overall concession zone were suitable and allowed for cotton 
growing, and Cotonang was obliged follow the Board in promoting 
concentration accordingly.96 Efforts to concentrate production on 
94  The total land reserved in such concentrations was 60,000 ha. See Cotonang 
1960; Gouveia (1956).
95  Farmers had also to arduously carry cotton loads to the set markets who-
se location was established by state agents, apparently along the roads for 
Cotonang’s convenience rather than close to lowland cotton ﬁ elds (see [1953] 
«Produção algodoeira indígena», BGU 332: 137).
96   Decreto 35844 of 1946, Art.3; See also Isaacman (1996: 133-134).
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«appropriate» soils were further bolstered after an extensive soils 
survey was done in mid-1954 by a state agronomist with the help 
of state and Cotonang employees. Colonial prejudice prevented 
administrators from addressing how concentration to enforce food-
crop production would not resolve nutritional problems, and in fact 
could exacerbate them by increasing traveling times, land clearance 
and weeding labor, and susceptibility to ﬂ ooding. For example, in 
the published ofﬁ cial legislation, the Colonial Minister dismissed 
food scarcity in cotton zones as due to «the naturally lazy and fata-
list psychology of bantu people».97 
A fairly exhaustive household nutrition survey across the Baixa 
by the President of Angola’s Provincial Nutrition Commission had 
found that «The separation between the villages and the ﬁ elds 
for cultivation creates a modus vivendi on the part of the popula-
tions that results in a low nutritional level» (NUNES 1960: 399). 
However, the report did not criticize the problem of the state de-
signating distant cotton areas, but instead proposed increasing 
the ongoing concentration of people near designated cotton plots. 
Such dislocation was simultaneously meaningful and material, as 
people were uprooted from their homes where they had ritually 
treated, or planted beneath milolo trees, their children’s placen-
tas so as to ensure their children’s health and intelligence, which 
were in evident decline (See SALAZAR 1968, vol. 1: 153; vol. 2: 
65). Reported instructions during the revolt spoke to the political 
importance of these speciﬁ cally domestic aspects of grievances, 
requiring revolters to «be done with the grass houses» of the sort 
built as temporary encampments in the cotton concentrations, 
and consequently avoid the irritating cramped space and chan-
ged gendered division of labor in such temporary encampments: 
«[do] not have utensils and items in the bedroom but rather in 
the kitchen, another house, or outside», and «only women can 
cook» (PALMA op. cit.; Informação 216). 
Spatial restructuring that forced planting in areas that would la-
ter be ﬂ ooded caused resentment, which was an important proxi-
mate grievance of the revolt (DIAS DOS SANTOS 1961: 5-6). It was 
97   Decreto 35844 of 1946, §9c.
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distinctly not as simple as heavy rains alone prompting the revolt 
— rather, because of spatial restructuring of settlement and cultiva-
tion, there was a public-private production of vulnerability to rains. 
The cotton crop losses to ﬂ ooding were not a ﬂ uke of nature.
The heavy rains in 1960 marked the return of a grievance about 
forced cultivation in lowlands that had — after similar March 1956 
ﬂ ooding in lowlands (planted after a dry January and February) 
— prompted hundreds of farmers in Kambo to stop cultivation 
and/or ﬂ ee, with the government and Cotonang in turn tightening 
enforcement and concentration (See COTONANG 1956, Relatório e 
Contas). The Cotton Export Board had actually proposed in 1948 
that certain zones be dropped (Tembo Aluma, Kwango, and Lure-
mo), but this was rejected by the Malanje Governor (DIAS DOS SAN-
TOS 1961: 5). These areas of sandy soils were also given the lowest 
aptitude for cotton by the 1954 soil survey (GOUVEIA 1956).98 Con-
tinued high production was desired to recoup the heavy costs of 
various new deseeding machines and a massive new 18,000-conto 
cotton seed oil factory opened in late 1957 in Malanje (See Angola 
Norte, November 30, 1957). Soil conservation works were imple-
mented on nearly 30,000 ha of land (cotton and food) in 1957. 
«Stabilization», said Cotonang in 1957, was the «object of our 
utmost attention», and again soil conservation works and «ﬁ xa-
tion to the land» — in tight collaboration with the state — was em-
phasized in 1958-60 (COTONANG (various years) Relatório e Con-
tas). These measures to control erosion and concentrate cotton 
production in ﬂ ood-prone lowlands helped boost production to an 
all-time high in 1958, but at the cost of vulnerability to rains in the 
next two years. The largest drop in production after the 1960 rains 
was in Kambo (dropping 43%). A report after the revolt noted that 
farmers did not receive assistance designated by law during the 
1960 ﬂ ooding, and «it was on the margins of the Lui River, which 
forced producers to do two or three plantings each year, where 
there were the ﬁ rst incidents [of the revolt]».99 
98   There major different zones are between Chromic Luvisols (LVx) and Ferralic and 
Haplic Arenosols (ARf and ARo).
99  Neto, J. (1961) «Apontamento 41: Considerações sobre a cultura algodoeira da 
Baixa de Cassange», March 14, p. 40 (AHU).
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Figure 12. 1926 cotton gin zones (25km)
Source: Boletim Oﬁ cial, misc. 
Figure 13. Survey of village-ﬁ eld distance 1958-1959
 
Distance of village to ﬁ eld (kms) % of 147 Villagesa       % of 475 Villagesb
        <1 16% 
       1-2 16%                   76%
      2-3 27% 
      3-4 18% 
     4-10 18%                    15%
                 10-20 2%             8%
                 20-30 1%             1%
                 30-40 0% 
                 40-50 1% 
Source: (a) Nunes (1960: 296) (b) Dias dos Santos (1961: 8)
  
The mixing of material and meaningful, of land, water, and reli-
gion, was evident in the way that adhesion to the revolt was repor-
tedly secured through a sort of baptismal pledge in which drops of 
water were put on people’s heads, then a token payment made, gun 
shots ﬁ red, and a cross drawn on the ground.100 As the pledge holy
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100   Antonio Bernardo Cabrita, Report, January 30, 1961, p. 2 (AHU).
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Figure 14. Erosion defense Figure 15. Transporting Cotonang
   work at the Canzel cotton        Equipment through ﬂ ooded
       concentration, 1954   areas of the Baixa
 
      Source: Gouveia (1956: 199)      Source: Salazar (1968: vol. 2, 155)
water dripped over their heads like the rivers spreading across An-
gola that they knew so well, they would try to use the river water 
that had last year ﬂ ooded their ﬁ elds to their advantage this time, 
planning destruction of bridges and pontoons in order to impede 
state troops and reprisals.
In addition to susceptibility to ﬂ ooding, the designation of lo-
wland cotton cultivation areas and the strict planting schedule 
also entailed heavy labor demands for weeding, another source of 
grievances. There was thus a combination of structural grievances 
about long-term hunger produced as women spent increasing time 
on weeding imperata in the new concentrations) and proximate 
grievances that December 1960 when men were preparing ﬁ elds. 
Being forced to work on heavy lowlands and/or areas infested by 
the rhizomatic weed imperata could make the work much more ar-
duous than ofﬁ cial calculations.101 Conducting participant observa-
tion research in which I farmed and conversed with farmers in their 
ﬁ elds helped give me a closer understanding of imperata — known 
locally in Kimbundu as «senu» — and prompted me to be more at-
tentive to imperata in the historical records. Gouveia’s (1956) soil 
survey of the Baixa mentions imperata 34 times. Imperata increased 

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101  As a rhizome, the sharp imperata re-grows if any root material is left over, re-
quiring prolonged fallowing to reduce its prevalence. See also Salazar (1968, 
vol. 2: 10).
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the heavy labor by men in the initial preparation to clear the weed’s 
dense root mats, as well as by women in rounds of weeding the im-
perata shoots that will sprout from any small fragment of the weed’s 
root mat. Illustrative of its importance, a known saying at time held 
that «Seno land is cotton land» (SALAZAR 1968, vol. 1: 32). Colonial 
and Cotonang administrators may have helped spread imperata by 
requiring annual burning of cotton plant residues because ﬁ res sti-
mulate imperata growth. Administrators required annual burnings 
of cotton plant stalks in order to reduce pest accumulation in the mo-
nocropped ﬁ elds, and such burnings also required strict adherence 
to state established planting calendars so as to prevent damage to 
any still unharvested cotton — it was such a strict calendar that also 
increased the susceptibility to ﬂ ooding of early planted ﬁ elds (MACDO-
NALD 2004).102 It is hardly any coincidence that instructions for 
revolters in the Baixa de Kassanje were to use the tough stems 
of imperata to braid belts and bracelets that would help ward off 
bullets (in conjunction with holy water and incantations of Maria) 
(SALAZAR 1968: 86).103 
The work of weeding cotton lands possibly fell largely to women, 
who the state attempted to compel through their husbands and 
male heads of households, in a strategy of patriarchal indirect rule. 
For example, the mandatory passbooks that were required for inha-
bitants of the Baixa in order for colonial administrators to monitor 
cotton production put the male head of the household as responsi-
ble for the production requirements of the entire family. Although 
the colonial reports say relatively little explicitly about the roles of 
gender and women in the revolt, we can attempt to «listen to the 
silences» and see that this system of patriarchal indirect rule for 
obligatory cotton production may have resulted in domestic pres-
sures for men to revolt, since they were caught between humilia-
ting and emasculating punishment by the colonial administration, 
or pushing their wives and family to work to meet quotas and taxes 
to such an extent that their own families’ nutrition and living con-
ditions were harmed.
102  For example, in 1936, all uprooting and burning was supposed to occur from 
20-30 September. See Instruções 6, Ordem de Malange n9, October 28, 1935.
103  See also interview with Elisa Kapunga, recounted in Paredes (2015: 216). Senu 
was also reportedly used for roof thatching and braided dishes (SALAZAR 1968, 
vol. 1: 119, 154).
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Source: Gouveia (1956: 158) 
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Figure 16. Imperata lowlands, near Luhanda River, 
between Milando and Kunda dya Baze
 
Source: Gouveia (1956: 158)
We also see revolters reject this distinctly patriarchal sort of 
Portuguese authority. Whereas an initial administrator trying to 
calm revolters referred to them patronizingly as «my children», the 
revolt included proliferating shouts and chants debasing such au-
thority by proclaiming the Portuguese state was actually just «bird 
shit» (Maniputo, tuge ia gingila).104 Revolt reports seemed taken 
aback by, and critical of, the unusual assertiveness and lack of obe-
dience by revolters, who are described as threatening, offending, 
and disrespecting. Relatedly, and perhaps also pertaining to domes-
tic conﬂ icts over different labor contributions to obligatory cotton 
quotas, revolt prescriptions included an emboldened roles for wo-
men in violent encounters: «If a man hits a woman, she will do the 
same to him and will say reconciliation and peace accomplished» 
(PALMA, op. cit.).105 Moreover, the sexual assaults by colonial admi-
nistrators and African functionaries that were used as punishment 
or abuse of discretionary authority were also inverted as some re-
volters threatened administrators’ wives in Kunda dya Baze (MAR-
TINS, «Apontamento», op. cit, p. 41. See also KARAJE 2006). 
104  Pereira, A. (1961) «Informação», Cotonang-Sector de Cunda Ria Base, February 
2 (AHU). Also later spelled «Mueneputo».
105   This quote could perhaps also refer to encounters with colonial administrators, 
but it is listed amongst other measure referring to domestic issues.
A
h
ar
on
 d
e 
G
ra
ss
i
108
The issues just described — labor time conﬂ icts, concentration 
and spatial restructuring, ﬂ ooding, and imperata weeds — occurred 
in relation to one another. And so the revolt seems to have been 
less sparked initially by a drop in prices paid by Cotonang (as some 
publications have perhaps mistakenly repeated). In the protestors’ 
own views, as cited in ofﬁ cial colonial reports, the emphasis was 
repeatedly on exactions working for the state, and paying taxes, and 
being forced to grow cotton, and almost never is price mentioned at 
all. The immediate material sparks to the revolt were weeding labor 
demands for the plating season, state census demands, and taxa-
tion, while a proximate cause was the preceding year’s loss caused 
by an artiﬁ cial vulnerability to heavy rains, a vulnerability directly 
produced by state mandates on village concentration and engine-
ered by state personnel, and which had been part of a larger sta-
te spatial project of concentration for decades throughout Angola. 
Kassanje, rather than reveal effective state delegation to a private 
enclave, reveals its opposite, namely vast and intensive state spatial 
concern, intervention and inﬂ uence.
Similarly, Cotonang’s actual concession did not begin as a discrete 
unit, but rather entailed a transformation from the 1926 legislation 
that allowed sparse ginning factories with rights to the surrounding 
areas in a maximum 25 km radius (later 60 km) (see Figure 12 abo-
ve). As Cotonang cotton production expanded whilst global markets 
declined during the 1930s, the state emphasized the need for closer 
regulation of cotton quality, production, and labor. The Portugue-
se state wanted to encourage investment, and yet balance concerns 
about unfavorable monopolistic practices and also national versus 
foreign capture of economic opportunities (CLARENCE-SMITH 1985). 
From this early period onward, there was increasingly close collabo-
ration between Cotonang and the Portuguese administrative appa-
ratus in the Baixa de Kassanje. The multiple fragmented conces-
sions were re-organized in 1940 from scattered factory-radius zones 
to concessions that matched administrative districts. Then, by 1947, 
these were united into what was subsequently known as a singular 
concession consisting of 12 administrative post areas that covered 
most of the Baixa de Kassanje.106 Cotonang consistently emphasi-
106   The posts were Kwango and Luremo (in the Circunscrição of Kamaxilo), Kambo, 
Brito Godins, and Tembo Aluma (in Kambo), Songo and Kitapa (in Songo), Kela, 
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zed what it referred to as its «collaboration with the authorities», 
and dozens of detailed pieces of legislation spelled out detailed roles 
for the state in shaping and participating in Cotonang’s activities. 
In other words then, the revolt was about the intense and ex-
tensive presence of the state in conjunction with the company in 
the Baixa de Kassanje, and the particular spatial transformations 
in production, rather than simply low or declining prices paid by an 
abusive concessionaire. Indeed the actual ofﬁ cial nominal producer 
prices paid to farmers for cotton do not appear to have been decli-
ning, though perhaps these ofﬁ cial prices were not being paid by 
Cotonang agents since the real world and colonial prices had been 
declining (see Figure 17 below).107 Moreover, rather than a conﬁ ned 
enclave, Cotonang had a regional and international presence — in 
the shareholders that had direct interests in infrastructure, mining, 
commerce, etc in the region, in the actual facilities in the cities of 
Malanje and Luanda, and in the network of cotton business experts 
in neighboring Congo and elsewhere in Africa and the world.108 
 Lui and Iongo (in Bongdo e Bangala), and Kwale and Forte Republica (in Duque 
de Bragança). Part of the economics of the concessions was also about coordi-
nation, competition, and capacity in the use/control of the de-seeding factories, 
transport and land. Transport of heavy unseeded cotton was more costly. If a 
company controlled the de-seeder, it could prevent rival companies from using 
it, and hence force them to ship heavier cotton and pay more (BGU 1934, n108: 
190-191). Also at issue was the full utilization of land, so that concessionaires 
would not claim more land than they were using for their factories. Investment 
in processing capacity happened in 1940, after the administrative re-organiza-
tion. Cotonang reported paying no dividents through 1945 at least, as proﬁ ts 
were reinvested in expanding production and processing facilities. Angola (and 
Congo) used an adapted American variety, Triumph Big Boll. Cotonang’s gins 
and machinery were upgraded and enlarged with new equipment purchased 
with expanding cotton revenues. Backward linkages from new textile weaving 
standards by Porto industrialists prompted Cotonang and JEA in 1955-6 to force 
farmers to switch to a new longer-ﬁ ber seed variety that was less productive and 
differed agronomically (GEORGES 1960). On regional and global historical trans-
formations in the cotton industry, see Beckert (2014), Smith and Cothren (1999), 
Isaacman and Roberts (1995).
107  Freudenthal (1999: 253) cites Marcum (1969: 124-126) as suggesting cotton 
prices declined, however it was declines in production that resulted in far-
mers’ declining revenues. Marcum (1969: 126) cites LeMaster’s (1962) un-
supported statement «Cotton prices had gone down; the workers weren’t 
being paid, and they refused to work».
108  Of note is that Ernesto Vilhena, through the Banco Burnay, held large ﬁ nancial 
stakes and inﬂ uential managerial positions in the Luanda-Malanje Railroad, Co-
tonang, and Diamang.
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The close collaboration between the state and Cotonang agents at 
the local level encompassed both formalized legal ways, and in in-
formal social ways. Cotonang’s reports — internal and published — 
speak frequently about close collaboration with the state. For exam-
ple, state authorities were responsible for enforcing mandatory 
acreages, setting cotton prices, delimiting cultivable areas, setting 
cultivation calendars, mobilizing labor for road work, approving 
seed varieties, facilitating conservation projects, locating and pre-
siding over markets, and so on. So, the revolt by cotton farmers was 
not just about abuses by Cotonang as a private concessionaire alo-
ne, but rather about the abuses that arose from both explicit state-
private collaboration as well as state agents’ deliberate ignorance, 
ambiguity and complicity in illegal practices — what Rebocho Vaz, 
the commanding military ofﬁ cer in Kassanje and later governor of 
Angola, described as «a great conspiracy of silence» (REBOCHO VAZ 
1993: 36).
Figure 17. Cotton price trends, 1939-1960: Angola purchase prices 
(Minimum and maximum for quality I & II), and Portuguese Colonial 
and World Prices (escudos and index)
 
Source: d’Eça (1961: 5); Pitcher (1993: 289)
What was key was that state agents had personal ﬁ nancial in-
centives to boost production, which they did by various means, be-
cause by law they received salary bonuses based on levels of cotton 



index) 
 

A
rt
ig
os
 -
 R
et
h
in
ki
n
g 
th
e 
19
6
1 
B
ai
xa
 d
e 
K
as
sa
n
je
 r
ev
ol
t:
 T
ow
ar
d
s 
a 
re
la
ti
on
al
 G
eo
-H
is
to
ry
 o
f 
A
n
go
la
111
production.109 So ostentatious were some state agents’ conspicuou-
sly consumption — evident in ostentatious new houses and crui-
sing cars — based on these cotton bonuses (which could effectively 
double their salaries) that they were criticized by military comman-
ders called in to quell the revolt.110 And the beneﬁ ts to state agents 
working in the land of «white gold» had long been recognized. The 
Malanje Governor noted in 1935 for example that state agents’ «greater 
remuneration obtained in the area of [cotton] intendancy [...] in-
ﬂ uences the interest with which the authorities follow the march 
of agricultural operations, and it beneﬁ ts production» (26). The 
bonuses prompted greater numbers of functionaries with better 
qualiﬁ cations to want to work there, putting strains on other areas, 
becoming «so ﬂ agrant that it could collapse the whole system [...]» 
In early January, 1961, villagers responded that they would not send 
people for public works, and «for a long time they had come work 
for the State, but now they would not do it».111 
Cotonang was also required by law to collaborate with the JEA 
and to fulﬁ ll a number of social obligations and labor protection re-
quirements. Informally, Cotonang actively and intensely cultivated 
high-level political relationships in Lisbon and Luanda (particularly 
given the emphasis on national industries), but also with ground-level 
administrators in the cotton growing areas. In the city of Malan-
je, Cotonang was close with the commercial associations, with the 
provincial newspaper, and emphasized its paternal relations in «the 
Cotonang family» (FERREIRA 1948; GEORGES 1955, 1960). 
In sum, this article has emphasized a multiplicity of shifting spa-
tial connections in order to re-interpret and explain the 1961 revolt in 
Kassanje. Understanding these connections is all the more important 
because of what happened next. The ways in which the colonial 
109  Administrators and Chefes de Circunscrições would receive 0.02 Angolars for 
each kilogram of unprocessed cotton produced in their jurisdiction, Chefes de 
Posto de Policia Civil would receive 0.04 Angolares, and a technical functionary 
in the Malanje Agriculture Department monitoring the whole Malanje District 
would receive 0.01 Angolar, ostensibly to compensate these state agents’ for their 
vigilence and propaganda efforts and trips in promoting cotton production (see 
Articles 3 and 6 of Diploma Legislativo 276 of 5 November 1931). See also Pélis-
sier (1978: 408).
110   Neto, «Apontamento 41», op. cit., and «Algumas considerações acerca da Zona 
Algodoeira da Baixa do Cassange», November 29, 1960, pp. 5-6 (AHU).
111   Letter, Alberto M. Quadros, February 6, 1961, p. 2 (AHU); Martins, «Aponta-
mento 34», op. cit., p. 24.
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government and settlers responded with farm mechanization, in-
frastructure and regional development as counter-insurgency mea-
sures would partly shape the post-independence projects, and, ulti-
mately, also now post-2002 national reconstruction.
6. Some roots of contemporary reconstruction 
approaches
Understanding the extensive connections that gave rise to the 
Kassanje revolt is also important to understanding the subsequent 
late-colonial spatial development programs that have in turn sha-
ped contemporary reconstruction. Many of the plans for Angola’s 
post-2002 reconstruction of infrastructure were outlined in a mas-
sive multi-volume 2025 Long Term Development Strategy, which 
often drew on comparisons with the late colonial era conditions and 
regional development plans (cf. POWER 2012). These contempora-
ry projects draw partly on Angolan colonial regional development 
planning which in turn drew on various currents of thinking, some 
linked through Brazil to classic French theories, as well as the emer-
ging experience with hydroelectric irrigation projects across Africa. 
But, in particular, it was after the 1961 revolts in Kassanje, in urban 
Luanda, and on the coffee plantations in the north, that the spatial 
experiences of and plans for Angola were laid out in great detail.112 
Regional economic development inventories and plans were 
compiled in 1962 in a signiﬁ cant two-volume study by the inﬂ uential 
Portuguese economist and planner Walter Marques, then working 
in the ofﬁ ce of Angola’s top army commander. Marques subsequen-
tly became Angola’s Provincial Secretary for Finance and proceeded 
112   Explicit post-World War II theorizations of «growth poles» was done most 
notably in France by the economist François Perroux during the reconstruction 
period there in 1940s and 1950s with ﬁ nancing through the Marshall Plan, ai-
ming to emphasize France’s eight metropolitan regions to balance out growth 
with Paris. This approach would arrive in colonial Angola both through Portu-
guese familiarity with the French analyses and through their international cir-
culation at that time, including a 1961 study, «Angola: Development poles and 
perspectives», which also situated Angola’s emerging hydro-electric and irriga-
tion schemes in relation to Africa more broadly. Such models would also be recir-
culated and revived in Angola after independence via Brazilian experiences that 
also drew on Perroux.
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to push through funding for the planned projects.113 In a systematic 
fashion his study inventoried the plans for regional poles and linka-
ges in Angolan development. The study and its approaches were key 
parts of executing a broader counter-insurgency strategy that was 
geared around a multi-pronged approach implemented primarily 
by small local mobile units.
Development poles were part of a broader colonial state spatial 
program of regional development for counter-insurgency (See PINTO 
and SANTOS 1961; PINTO 1959; SANTOS 1960).114 This program — 
directly inﬂ uenced by British and French colonial experience — had 
as one key plank «social development», as formally outlined in the 
guiding document, «The Army in Subversive War».115 In addition 
to psycho-social action involving culture and propaganda, the so-
cial plank emphasized four dimensions: (1) education, (2) sanitary 
assistance, (3) economic development in agriculture and cattle hus-
bandry, and (4) local infrastructure improvements. Administrative 
presence throughout the country was signiﬁ cantly increased throu-
gh increased numbers of posts, and more numerous smaller admi-
nistrative districts (see Figure 18).116 
Road construction and logistics would be critical to these activi-
ties and to the small mobile local army units tasked with facilitating 
them. Altogether, the development poles, regional social develop-
ment, and infrastructure construction laid out as part of late-colo-
nial counter-insurgency would inﬂ uence the post-independence so-
cialist government’s plans, be deliberately targeted by UNITA during
113   The study was published as Marques (1964), though some of the basic parame-
ters of planning and ﬁ nancing were actually drawn up through a series of 5-year 
colonial development plans, comprising 1953-1958, 1959-1964, 1968-1974, and 
1974-1979. These were termed «Planos de Fomento».
114  Perroux’s student, Jaques Boudeville, lived in Brazil and published a study on 
growth poles in Minas Gerais. A French geographer, Michel Rochefort, also 
strengthened pole thinking in Brazil, and the government began to incorporate 
these ideas in its policies in the 1960s in order to expand development beyond 
the concentrations in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (SERRA 2003; BUNKER 1989).
115  The key points, according to Cann’s (1997) account (rather apologetic), that the 
Portuguese came to emphasize after studying the issue were «minimum force, ci-
vil military cooperation, intelligence coordination, and small-unit operations» 
(44). Social development was part of all four. The Portuguese drew on British 
and French training and experience by territorial organization, with companies 
based in particular areas, and having small mobile units.
116  Tembo Aluma and Kambo were swiftly reorganized administratively. See Porta-
ria 12195 of April 18, 1962.
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Figure 18. Administrative Divisions and Posts, 1917-1960
 
Sources: Anuário Estatístico; Anuário do Império Colonial Português; Amorim (1917)
the war, and then serve as a base to be reconstructed and expanded 
in the post-war oil-boom era of sub-contracted reconstruction.
The importance of the overlap between military planning and 
post-1961 regional economic development is also illustrated by the 
fact that the governor of Angola for the key period 1966-1972 was 
Lieutenant Coronel Camilo Rebocho Vaz, who was promoted to 
that position after being the on-the-ground commander of the re-
pression of the 1961 revolts in the Baixa de Kassanje and northern 
coffee areas (and subsequently being the regional administrator of 
the rebellious Uíje northern coffee district from 1961 to 1966) (See 
REBOCHO VAZ 1993). 
It was these sorts of explicitly spatial regional development efforts 
that were revived with the 1984 contract for the Kapanda hydro-
electric dam, for example, in combination with Brazilian inﬂ uen-
ces, but effectively shelved during the war until 2002, when they 
were reworked again. Since the late 1990s, nearly a dozen industrial 
poles have been started, together with four tourism poles. And, in 
addition to Kapanda, four other agro-industrial poles were started 
in 2007, with a sixth in 2010, ranging around $75-97 million each. 
Such spatial tendencies also found expression in the 2003 Private 
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Investment Law, which prioritized seven economic sectors, and di-
vided the country into three different investment zones designed to 
give incentives for investment in and development of more remote 
and under-developed areas. In addition to the private investment 
law, regulations on territorial administration have also categorized 
different municipalities in to different types, with different structu-
res and different levels of state ﬁ nancing.
Thus, in contrast to portrayals of Angolan economic development 
as historically rooted only in oil, diamond or plantation enclaves, the 
actual development plans were acutely aware of and concerned by 
enclave development and motivated by the threat of growing popu-
lar insurgency to address it through a vast, dense spread of infras-
tructure and economic projects. And this longer, meaningful histo-
rical geography goes beyond developmentalist immediate concerns 
about infrastructure projects in terms of managerial efficiency, 
corruption of democracy, or economic inequality (SØREIDE 2011), to 
much deeper and complex sets of processes that have been brieﬂ y 
sketched above.
7. Conclusion
The preceding sections showed how people in and around the 
Baixa de Kassanje revolted against joint state-private coordinated 
spatial restructuring designed to overcome problems with produc-
tion and labor management. But it is also important to recognize the 
nationalist (and not only anti-colonial) aspects of the revolt because 
that also changes how we understand politics in and of the countrysi-
de — consciousness, connections, agency, contradictions, capabilities 
and so on — then and now. From the records examined so far, there 
does not emerge a single, totally clear or coherent shared sense of 
nationalism, but the complex and contradictory nationalist notions 
more truly reﬂ ect the actual context at that time of connections and 
ferment, rather than strict divisions of space and social groups.
Simply because some parts of the whole complex revolt did not 
conform to what were later forms of Angolan nationalism does not 
mean that the revolt did not have nationalist aspects, that it was 
«only anti-colonial» (See also COOPER 2014). It was a mix, but the-
re were direct links with what many people see as the main forms of 
modern nationalism, and there were aspects of the revolt that were 
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unequivocally clear about political demands for independence for a 
new supra-ethnic entity in the form of an Angolan nation-state. The 
above analysis has traced the variety of processes that conjoined 
to produce the revolt, and consequently the revolt was not always 
entirely coherent, it was sometimes partial and contradictory, and 
much remains occluded and yet to be researched.
Nonetheless, from the colonial reports we can see that several key 
forms of the modern nation-state were invoked during the revolt (in 
addition to the notions directly linked to UPA and the MPLA), inclu-
ding a new president, capital, government, symbology, and com-
mon identity. The new president would be called Kulashingo (which 
was an old title of a King of the Bangalas).117 There are repeated 
reports that the revolters were asserting that their own government 
held power, not the Portuguese.118 Sometimes, contradictorily, this 
was conﬂ ated or merged with the Congo, as in already having «their 
government headed by Kasavububu [sic]».119 Soba Kivota was re-
ported to have said that he and his community «wouldn’t pay taxes 
or follow orders because they already had “their State”, which was 
“Pessa”» («Informação 216», op. cit.). There was mention of a new 
capital being at Kasule Kwenda.120 The Portuguese ﬂ ag at Marimba 
was cut down. Some prominent national symbolism distinct from 
colonial Portugal seems to have been largely that of PSA, but the-
re are also vague references in the colonial reports to banners and 
ﬂ ags. As one report noted, amidst a crowd of 600 armed people in 
the border town Tembo Aluma at the end of January, «one of the 
indigenous exhibited, as if it was a ﬂ ag, a 1960 calendar edited by 
PSA».121  
Since there are hardly any Kimbundu statements transcribed in 
known colonial reports on the revolt, it is hard to tell to what extent 
the revolters used the language of «nation» or «nação», which has 
loose translation in Kimbundu as people («muntu»), or people of 
the land («akwa’xi») (MAIA 1994).What does come across clearly 
117    J. M. Pereira de Carvalho, Letter #543, February 27, 1961 (AHU). According to 
Marcum, citing Neto (1966), Kulaxingo was captured in March with Mariano 
near Luremo.
118   See Apontamento 14, op cit, p. See Vicente’s report 16th of January «Conside-
rações sôbre a situação actual da região do Milando».
119  J. M. Pereira de Carvalho, «Situação na Baixa de Cassange», Letter #250, 
January 27, 1951 (AHU).
120  J. M. Pereira de Carvalho, Letter #543, February 27, 1961 (AHU).
121   «Informação 144», February 6, 1961 (AHU).
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though is that the revolters thought of themselves as Angolans, as 
having a broad new common non-local identity going beyond older 
ethnic identiﬁ cations and distinct from the Portuguese. Maria «had 
been concerned about the suffering of Angolans», and was going 
to «save the people of Angola». The revolters «were all brothers», 
it had «become necessary that all Angolans initiate themselves in 
their religion and adhesion to the liberation movement», and An-
gola and Portugal would be separated forever (PALMA op. cit.; SALA-
ZAR 1968). The revolt managed to mobilize a signiﬁ cant portion of 
population, tens of thousands of people, across a large area about 
half the size of Portugal, who were not asking for reform, not asking 
for return to old, but rather stating that they were their own entity, 
if albeit a still unclear one, and one prevented by sheer overwhel-
ming Portuguese ﬁ repower.
Given Angola’s long history of complex mixes of differing forms 
of spatial connections — military interventions that were destabili-
zing, destructive and divisive, but also diaspora connections, and in-
ternational solidarity — an explicit focus on relational geo-histories 
can help move beyond exclusionary identity politics and unproduc-
tively confrontational international advocacy. This article has used 
a range of new evidence and approaches to re-examine the 1961 re-
volt in Baixa de Kassanje and re-interpret it as a transforming cross-
roads of nationalism rather than a reactionary economic enclave. In 
so doing, the argument has disrupted conventional narratives about 
Angolan history that over-emphasize relatively isolated enclaves of 
wealth extraction, as well as provided an alternative narrative that 
can actually account for the existence and character of post-1961 re-
gional development efforts as part of extensive counter-insurgency 
programs. This article has thus helped lay some of the necessary 
empirical and conceptual foundations for other research on how 
contemporary rural reconstruction projects emerge out of conjunc-
tures of geo-historical processes associated with settler colonialism, 
protracted war, socialist restructuring, and leveraged liberalization.
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Resumo: Através de uma reinterpretação geográfica e relacional do início da luta armada 
nacionalista em Angola, este artigo ajuda a criticar e ir além das interpretações comuns de 
Angola (e da África em geral), caracterizada por antigas divisões socio-espaciais. Em vez de 
um protesto económico num enclave, a chamada «revolta do algodão» continha de facto vá-
rios aspectos – alguns explicitamente nacionalistas – de uma mobilização forjada através de 
múltiplas ligações entre zonas urbanas e rurais, de Malanje e Luanda, bem como entre Angola 
e o recém-independente Congo. A revolta ocorreu no cruzamento transformador de Malanje 
enquanto rede política subterrânea de Luanda-Malanje, envolvendo igrejas, trabalhadores 
contratados e pessoal administrativo, que se cruzaram com a mobilização política provincial 
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